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CHAPTER I 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The reaction of the schizophrenic to conditions of 
"risk" (i.e., situations involving the threat of loss or 
failure) is an important aspect of recent theories of 
schizophrenia. However, the experimental studies of 
schizophrenic behavior under conditions of risk have been 
very limited. This study sought to examine both theories 
of schizophrenia and theoretical models of risk-taking be-
havior and from these derive hypotheses about the behavior 
of schizophrenics which would be tested by means of experi-
mental measures of risk-taking. In addition the data has 
been analyzed to answer a number of questions regarding the 
nature of the risk-taking behavior of the schizophrenic. 
The Schizophrenic Reaction 
One of the first concerns in the development of a 
theory of schizophrenia iswhether schizophrenia should be 
1 
2 
considered primarily physiogenic or psychogenic. Kraepelin, 1 
who first described the syndrome of dementia praecox (which 
we now term schizophrenia), felt clearly that it was organic 
(a progressive dementia). Bleuler2 who introduced the term 
schizophrenia appeared to have been rather uncertain about 
whether to consider schizophrenia to be physiogenic or psy-
chogenic, feeling that he could only speculate on this mat-
ter. Although strongly influenced by Freud's dynamic con-
ceptions and recognizing an analogy between schizophrenic 
behavior and hysteria, he favored an organic interpretation. 
Perhaps his focus on disturbance of association as the 
fundamental characteristic and his treatment of autism ("the 
inclination to divorce oneself from reality') as a conse-
quence of the disturbance of association, resulted in his 
preference for a physiogenic interpretation of schizophrenia. 
Many of the more recent theories, which we are about 
to discuss, treat schizophrenia as primarily psychogenic. 
We will show that these theories have much in common and 
that these common elements coincide with our general formu-
lation of the schizophrenic reaction. Our formulation is 
1Arieti, Silvano, Interpretation of Schizophrenia, 
New York, Brunner, 1955, Ch. 2. 
2Bleuler, Eugen, Dementia Praecox or the Group of 
Schizophrenias, New York, Internat. Univ. Press, 1950. 
that past failure in dealing with some aspects of reality 
results in a reaction of defensive withdrawal from situa-
tions or aspects of reality which threaten further failure. 
Withdrawal results in a deficit in the adequacy of response 
(i.e., a deficit in mental functioning). Thus we have 
three variables in our formulation: 1) threat of failure 
which is responded to with 2) withdrawal which results in 
3) a deficit in mental functioning. The variables of 
withdrawal and deficit in mental functioning characterize 
the responses of the schizophrenic. Threat of failure, 
which is equated with the concept of risk, characterizes 
the stimulus situation. 
Returning to the review of the literature, it may 
be noted, then, that Bleuler's concepts of autism and 
disturbance of associations coincide with the concepts of 
withdrawal and deficit in mental functioning used in this 
study, but the direction of the causal relationship is 
reversed. Since Bleuler's theory has a physiogenic base, 
Arieti, 3 in summarizing several important writers on 
schizophrenia, gives Adolf Meyer credit for providing the 
first clearly psychogenic theory of schizophrenia. Schizo-
phrenia, Meyer felt, was the result of an accumulation of 
faulty habit reactions. An inability to cope with the 
3 Arieti, loc. cit. 
3 
difficulties of life results in failures. These lead to 
substitutive reactions (i.e., decrease in interest, day-
dreaming, etc.). As the substitutive reactions increase 
in their control over behavior, they form the schizophrenic 
symptoms (i.e., delusions and hallucinations). At the same 
time the habits of constructive adjustment decrease, pro-
ducing further failure. One may note the similarity 
between this and the observation of Cameron4 that "the 
schizophrenic patient, because of his lost social skills, 
is a daydreamer who cannot completely return." Meyer's 
concept of substitutive reactions may be viewed as forms 
of withdrawal and the decrease in habits of constructive 
adjustment may be viewed as similar to deficit in mental 
functioning. 
Arieti observes that although Freud wrote only 
incidentally of schizophrenia, he provided many concepts 
useful in understanding the disorder. First, Freud dis-
tinguished psychosis, a disturbance between the ego and 
the environment, from neurosis, a conflict between the 
ego and the id. He characterized schizophrenia by with-
drawal of libido from the external world, with paranoia 
based on the mechanism of projection. He also provided 
4cameron, N., The Psycholog7 of the Behavior 
Disorders: a Biosocial Interpretat1on, Boston, Houghton-
Mifflin, 1947, p. 451. 
4 
5 
the concept of regression, 5 "a return to a former phase 
of development," which he felt resulted from the frustration 
of failure to receive gratification at higher levels. Here 
we find the concept of withdrawal expressed directly, while 
regression, a concept often used to characterize schizo-
phrenic behavior, implies a deficit in mental functioning. 
The treatment of regression as a result of failure is in 
keeping with our formulation. 
Jung, according to Arieti, perceived schizophrenia 
as based in autochthonus complexes resulting from 
dissociation and introversion. Dissociation may be inter-
preted as equivalent to deficit in mental functioning and 
introversion as equivalent to withdrawal. 
Arieti himself, drawing on Sullivan, saw the roots 
of schizophrenia in a failure to obtain approval in child-
hood and thus "security," which results in a thwarting of 
the development of self-esteem and self-identity, which in 
turn produces anxiety. A reactivation of this anxiety re-
sulting from a failure to defend one's self-esteem 
realistically produces a need to change reality, which the 
5Freud, S., The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud 
(A. A. Brill transl.), New York, Modern Library, 1938; 
An Outline of Pslchoanalysis, (J. Strachey Transl.), New 
York, Norton, 19 9. 
6 
individual does by entering a psychosis. This defense is 
fonnulated in terms of "escape from reality" (withdrawal), 
which is subdivided into "retreat from reason" (desymboliza-
tion), retreat from society (desocialization), and retreat 
from emotion (e.g., apathy). Arieti places special empha-
sis on the retreat from "Aristotelian" logic to "paleo-
logic" and the consequent "regression" to lower levels of 
functioning. He defines schizophrenia thus: 6 
Schizophrenia is a specific reaction to an extreme 
state of anxiety, originating in childhood, and 
reactivated later in life by psychological factors. 
The specific reaction consists of the adoption of 
archaic mental mechanisms, which belong to lower 
levels of integration. Inasmuch as the result is 
a regression to, but not an integration at lower 
levels, a disequilibrium is engendered which causes 
further regression, at times to levels even lower 
than the one in which certain perceptions are possi-
ble. 
It may be noted that reality can be specified in terms of 
the stimuli of reason, society, and emotions. Arieti then 
goes on to suggest that the various forms of schizophrenia 
may reflect withdrawal from different aspects of reality. 
Fenichel's7 fonnulation, based on Freud, focused 
on the concept of regression. "As a means of escape from 
6 Arieti, op. cit., p. 384. 
7Fenichel, otto, The PSSchoanalytic Theory of 
Neurosis, New York, Norton, 194 . 
a dangerous reality" the patient breaks with reality and 
regresses to an early narcissistic state in which he lived 
"before acquiring the capacity for reality testing." This 
regressed state of functioning is considered to explain 
both the "loss of object relations" and the "pre-logical" 
thinking of the schizophrenic. In focusing on regression, 
Fenichel indicates the intimate interaction between "with-
drawal" and the "disturbances of cognitive functioning." 
Excape from reality (or withdrawal) describes the purposive 
or motivational aspect of the schizophrenic regression and 
the primitive level of functioning describes the conse-
quences. As Fenichel points out, when denial of reality 
serves as the mode of escape, a primitive level of func-
tioning is required to maintain it. 
Jenkins8 perceived in the development of schizo-
phrenia a sequence similar to the one Arieti describes. 
Frustration results in withdrawal from the outer en-
vironment. This in turn leads to disorganization and 
finally to psychotic reorganization. Schizophrenic 
behavior, he felt, was analogous to the "frozen" be-
havior described by Maier of rats in a frustrating 
8Jenkins, R. L., The Nature of the Schizophrenic 
Process, Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 1950, 64, 
243-262; Tfie Schizophrenic Sequence: Withdrawal, 
Disorganization, Psychotic Reorganization, Amer. J. of 
Orthopsychiatry, 1952, 22, 738-748. 
7 
situation. 
Rodnick9 observed that many clinicians "account 
for schizophrenic behavior as a defensive response of 
withdrawal to failure, criticism, and threat." He also 
notes that many experimental studies indicate a response 
"deficit" of one sort or another in schizophrenics. He 
observes, however, that this deficit is not generalized, 
being, rather, a "selective responsivity to potentially 
stressful stimuli." Treating "withdrawal" and "deficit" 
8 
as operationally equivalent, he presents the hypothesis 
regarding schizophrenic behavior: "S Censure ~ R Deficit." 
Jost10 phrased the same theme in terms of "loss of 
self-esteem": 
As is generally known, there are numerous 
writers in the broad field of psychopathology who 
in theory and practice consider loss of self-esteem 
a most important agent in the development of schizo-
phrenia. Anton Boisen holds that the condition 
represents a reaction to an unfulfilled achievement 
drive, a condition shown by those who judge them-
selves as "personal failures." "There is no ob-jective measure of such maladjustment. The individual 
himself is the judge." This statement, phrased dif-
ferently, is encountered in the clinical literature 
9Rodnick, E.H. and Garmezy, N., An Experimental 
Approach to the Study of Motivation, in Jones (Ed.), Cur-
rent Theory and Research in Motivation, vol. 5, Linco!n; 
University of Nebraska Press, 1957, pp. 109-183. 
10Jost, K.C., The Level of Aspiration of Schizo-
phrenic and Normal Subjects, Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 1955, 50, 315-320. 
with startling regularity. Those who accept this 
loss of self-esteem as the core of psycho-
dynamics that gradually or rapidly leads into the 
eventual withdrawal from a feared environment go 
on to emphasize that the patient stops maintain-
ing his relationship (in degree) with those about 
him the better to protect himself from further 
threats to his self-esteem. Because loss of self-
esteem is so painful and because further losses 
through the medium of additional failures are 
psychologically catastrophic, the schizophrenic 
patient is more sensitive than the normal adult to 
situations involving threat of failure. 
Jost also notes that "schizophrenic patients in general 
show deficiencies in 'reality testing.'" 
Finally, it is interesting to note that part of 
Dollard 1 s11 description of the interaction among basic 
factors involved in neurosis includes the following re-
lationships: Fear ~ Repression ~ Stupidity. This ap-
pears similar to the formulation made in this study of the 
schizophrenic reaction, except that the neurotic defense 
of repression replaces the schizophrenic defense of with-
drawal. 
9 
We have shown that the three variables, threat of 
failure, withdrawal, and deficit in mental functioning 
coincide with the concepts used by many writers on 
schizophrenia and that our general formulation of the schizo-
phrenic reaction has many points in common with other 
11nollard, J. and Miller, N.E., Personalit~ and 
Ps~chotherapy: an Analysis in Terms of Learnin~~ T inking, 
an culture,~ew York, McGraw Hill, 1950, p. 2 . 
formulations. Let us now examine each of these three 
variables in greater detail. 
C. Discussion of the Three Variables in the General 
Formulation of the Schizophrenic Reaction. 
1. Threat of Failure 
10 
The stimulus which we have termed threat of failure 
will be dealt with in this study in its relation to the con-
cept of risks. Differentiating furthe~ threat of failure 
may be used to denote more the subjective impact of a situa-
tion in which failure is possible, while risk may be used 
to denote more the objective evaluation of the situation. 
One may ask, then, what kinds of risks (i.e., what kinds 
of situations involving the possibility of failing to 
achieve an objective or of losing) are felt as most 
threatening by schizophrenics. In review we note that 
some authors, such as Arieti and Dollard, emphasize the 
affect of anxiety or fear--the punishing aspect of failure, 
while others, such as Jenkins, emphasize the lack of 
reward--"frustration"--with the implication that adaptive 
attempts cease when they prove to be universally unsuccess-
ful. This suggests that the presence or absence of a 
penalty for failure may be a variable of some importance. 
Many authors emphasize that it is the social environment 
which is particularly threatening, since the roots of the 
11 
illness lie in a disordered relationship with the parents. 
Rodnick's choice of "censure" as a st~ll!s variable 
implies that failure is measured by the negative evalua-
tion by others. This suggests that possibly failure in 
interpersonal situations may be more threatening than 
failure in a situation involving only the individual. 
The importance of self-esteem and its maintenance or loss 
as an important aspect of failure is emphasized by several 
authors. This stresses the importance of the subjective 
evaluation of failure. Failure is felt chiefly when it 
indicates personal inadequacy and lowering of status. 
Without knowing the individual's value system, it is dif-
ficult to predict what sorts of objective failures are 
more likely to reduce the individual's self-esteem. 
D. Miller, 12 in interpreting personality disorders as de-
fenses against failure, emphasizes the importance of suc-
cess and failure in achievement in our culture in self-
evaluation and the maintenance of self-esteem. Thus, it 
would appear that failure in situations involving achieve-
ment is likely to be more threatening. Achievement vs. 
non-achievement situations may be considered in terms of 
the work situation in which the outcome is very 
1~iller, D., Responses of Psychiatric Patients to 
Threat of Failure, J. Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1951, 
46' 37-8-387. 
important vs. the play situation in which the outcome is 
less important than the activity itself. It may also be 
viewed as a situation in which the individual may through 
his effort and ability control the outcome as opposed to 
the chance situation where external forces determine the 
outcome and the individual is not responsible for it. 
Finally there may be more threat in a situation in which 
there is threat of a real failure than in a hypothetical 
situation verbally presented in which the threat is only 
in fantasy. 
2. Withdrawal 
12 
Withdrawal (or retreat or avoidance), as a defense 
mechanism, or "formal mechanism" as Arieti calls it, is 
an intervening variable which may be expressed in a number 
of different response patterns. Arieti, as we have noted, 
speaks of retreat from society, logic, affect, and from 
action, and presumes that schizophrenics differ on which 
mode of retreat is emphasized. If we attempt to measure 
withdrawal as demonstrated by action in a choice situation 
involving greater or lesser threat of failure, we would 
expect that a simple withdrawal would result in a choice 
of the alternative involving less threat. However, if we 
consider "denial" of an aspect of reality to be a form of 
withdrawal, we may have individuals who deny the possibil-
ity or the import of failure. Thus they may act only on 
13 
the basis of the rewards of success, and choose those situa-
tions involving greater objective threat of failure. Thus 
a simple withdrawal would lead a schizophrenic to select 
the least risky alternative and withdrawal in the form of 
denial would lead him to select the most risky alternative. 
This would result in schizophrenics choosing the middle 
range of risks relatively less frequently than would normal 
individuals. 
3. Deficit in Mental Functioning 
Finally we must consider the "deficit in mental 
functioning," which results from the schizophrenic with-
drawal, and the sort of responses one might expect in an 
experimental situation. First, if the deficit is severe, 
the patient may react in a disorganized manner making random 
responses or responding with some pattern (e.g., position 
preference) without comprehending the content of the 
experimental test. Such a response should yield the sort 
of scores on a test scale that might be expected from 
random choice. When the deficit is partial, the patient 
may over-simplify the test situation, reacting to only one 
aspect of the test stimuli. Shakow13 observes that the 
schizophrenic "appears to simplify the experimental 
13shakow David, Some Psychological Features of 
Schizophrenia, Ch. 31 of Reymert (Ed.), Feelings and 
Emotions, New York, McGraw Hill, 1950. 
situation." Such a response may be expected to lead to 
more frequent selection of extreme or unusual choices. 
Thus, one would predict, both as a result of defensive 
withdrawal and partial deficit in comprehension that pro-
duces an oversimplification, that the schizophrenic in 
situations involving the threat of failure is more likely 
to make extreme choices than normal individuals. Corres-
pondingly, he is less likely to select items representing 
the middle of the range. 
D. Schizophrenic Subgroups 
Since the establishment of dementia praecox or 
schizophrenia as a diagnostic category, subcategories 
have been recognized as symptom syndromes. By some these 
subcategories have been treated as evidence for consider-
ing schizophrenia as not a single entity but as a group 
14 
of separate entities collected under the same heading; 
others have felt these subcategories were merely secondary 
manifestations of a single primary disease entity. As 
noted previously, both Jenkins and Arieti interpret the 
schizophrenic subtypes within the framework of their 
theories. In this they are more discrepant than in their 
general theories of schizophrenia. Rabin and King, 14 
14aabin, A.I. and King, G.F., Psychological Studies, 
Ch. 6 of Bellak, Schizophrenia: a Review of the Syndrome 
Logos, New York, 1958. 
15 
reviewing the various diagnostic subgroups which have been 
used, suggest that by using a homogeneous sub-group of 
schizophrenics in research one's results are more likely 
• 
to be significant and meaningful. The divisions which 
appear to be most emphasized by them are chronic vs. acute 
and paranoid vs. non-paranoid. Of these the paranoid vs. 
non-paranoid division has for us the most important theo-
retical implications. The distinctiveness of the paranoid 
defenses of denial and projection has resulted in the 
establishment of a separate disease category of paranoia, 
although apparently very few cases are diagnosed as 
paranoia only. The paranoid is described as projecting 
the blame for his failing on others and of delusions of 
grandeur. By being able to project the blame for failure 
he can deny its threat to his self esteem and, so, may 
select the more risky alternatives with impunity. Thus 
one would predict that paranoid schizophrenics as a group 
will when faced with situations involving threats of fail-
ure more often choose those involving the greater threat 
than will the non-paranoid schizophrenics. 
the 
A. The Bquivalence of Two Models 
Viewing the schizophrenic reaction as a reaction 
to the threat of failure suggests that it may prove 
profitable to examine models which have attempted to 
formulate decision making where the outcome in terms of 
success and failure is not certain. The first of these 
models, developed ~gely out of a background of economic 
theory and formalized by Von Neumann and Morganstern, is 
summarized succinctly by Siegel: 15 
Under conditions of uncertainty individuals behave 
16 
as if they were attempting to maximize expected 
utility •.•• An individual's decisions underlying 
his choices among alternatives involving uncertain 
outcome (outcomes with stated probability of at-
tainment) are based on the utilities of the entities (objects, actions, goals, etc.) and on the probabil-
ities (subjective probabilities for most decision 
theorists) associated with attainment of the entities. 
The decisions are a function of these two variables 
(utility and subjective probability) in that the 
individual seeks by this choices to maximize the sum 
of the products of the probability and utility, i.e. 
he acts so as to maximize SEU : piui where SEU is 
the subjective expected utility. 
It may be noted that the above formula is an 
analogue of the expected value model in which the expected 
15siegel, Sidney, Level of Aspiration and Decision 
Making, Psychological Review, 1957, 64, 253-262. · 
17 
(objective) value of a decision is the sum of the products 
of the objective probabilities and the objective values of 
the possible outcomes. This model is often found expressing 
the special case in which the outcomes are reduced to two: 
win and lose. Then we have the formula EV • pR - p'L, 
where EV is the expected value, E is the probability of 
winning, R is the amount of reward, E' (or (1-p)) is the 
probability of losing, and L is the amount of loss. The 
"expected (objective) value model" may serve as a "rational" 
model from which subjective variation is measured. 
Siege116 also describes briefly the model developed 
by Lewin ~ al. around the concept of "level of aspiration" 
and demonstrate the equivalence of the two models: 
Lewin et al. assert that the level of aspiration 
set byiaperson is a function of three factors: 
(a) "the seeking for.IIIJCcess," (b) the avoidance of 
failure," and (c) "the cognitive factor of probabil-
ity judgement." The last mentioned factor refers 
to the individual's subjective probability of achiev-
ing a goal. Each of the three concepts of Lewinian 
theory may be "translated" directly to an equivalent 
concept in decision theory. The achievement scale 
may be thought of as a utility scale, where utility 
refers to the subjective value [valence] of an entity 
(goal, action, object) as distinguished from its 
objective of "face" value. It is the contention of 
this paper that each level ori an achievement scale 
has a certain utility for a person and that therefore 
the level of aspiration may be conceived as a "point" 
16siegel, Sidney, loc. cit. 
on a scale of utility. An achievement which rep-
resents "success" in Lewinian terms may be thought 
of in decision theory terms as one which has 
"positive utility. 11 An achievement which repre-
sents "failure" to a person may be thought of as 
having "negative utility" for him. And the 
Lewinian notion of "subjective probability" needs 
no translation, for the same term is used in deci-
sion theory. 
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Siegel goes on to demonstrate that Lewin combines the 
valences and probabilities of success and failure in a 
manner identical with the expected utility model. Lewin's 
"level of aspiration," which is the choice of the entity 
having the maximum "resultant weighted valence" is 
equivalent to "acting so as to maximize the subjective 
expected utility. 11 It may be noted that one does not 
measure the subjective probabilities and valences inde-
pendently, but only in combination as a resultant 
weighted valence. 
B. Differences between Level of Aspiration and Decision 
Theory Studies 
Although it has been shown by Siegel that the level 
of aspiration model and the decision theory model are 
basically equivalent, the experimental methods employed 
under the aegis of the two theories, and some theoretical 
elaborations as well, are somewhat different. Therefore 
they may measure somewhat different factors. 
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1. The Motive 
The level of aspiration studies17 usually involve 
some measure in which the subject's skill is involved and 
the motive which may be rewarded is achievement by demon-
strating a certain level of proficiency. Although the 
concept of "utility" in decision theory serves any motive, 
decision theory experiments usually have employed a game 
of chance. Since the outcome of a bet in these games of 
chance is a matter of chance rather than personal skill, 
one may expect that it is the monetary reward more than 
the sense of achievement that is the motivating force. 
Atkinson, however, claims that the preferences in the 
two situations are similar: 18 
We have repeated the Edwards type experiment. • • . 
The same differential preference for intermediate 
risk was shown by these same subjects when they 
were allowed to choose the distance from the target 
for their shots in a shuffleboard game. In other 
words, the incentive values of winning qua winning, 
and losing qua losing, presumably developed in 
achievement activities early in life, generalize to 
the gambling situation in which winning is really 
~ contingent upon one's own skill and competence. 
17 Lewin, K., Dembo T., Festinger L., Sears, P.S., 
Level of Aspiration, in Hunt, (Ed.), Personalit* and 
Behavior Disorders, New York, Ronald Press, 19~, pp. 333-
378. 
18Atkinson, J.R., Motivational Determinants of 
Risk-Taking Behavior, Psychological Review, 1957, 64, 
359-372. 
Feather, 19 on the other hand, demonstrates significant 
differences in behavior depending upon whether the situa-
tion was presented as a "game" or a 'test" (i.e. , "relaxed 
vs. achievement") and whether the outcome was a matter of 
skill or chance (i.e., "ego related vs. chance"). It 
would appear, then, that there are both common and unique 
factors operating here. 
2. Relation of Reward to Probability 
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In the decision theory experiments the level of 
objective probability and monetary reward may be manipulated 
independently by the experimenter, and using the expected 
value model, a bet at any level of probability may be made 
equal to, greater than, or less than the expected value of 
a bet at another level by manipulating the reward. In the 
level of aspiration experiments the levels of probability 
and reward are much less under the control of the experi-
menter. The reward in terms of achievement is intrinsically 
related to the relative difficulty of the task, which is 
directly related to the subjective probability of failure. 
This is most clearly seen in Atkinson's formulations, which 
19Feather, N.T., Subjective Probability and Decision 
under Uncertainty, Psychological Review, 1959, 66, 150-164. 
are an extention of those of Lewin. Atkinson's formula-
tions are described here in considerable detail for two 
additional reasons: 1) His model is used by the experi-
menter as a basis for choosing the levels of probability 
utilized in this study; 2) The prediction he derives from 
the structure of his model about the behavior of patho-
logical groups in general are very similar to a prediction 
made by the experimenter regarding the behavior of schizo-
phrenics. First, Atkinson divides Lewin's "valence" into 
two parts: "motive" and "incentive" (valence = motive x 
incentive). In so doing, he makes explicit some of the 
characteristics of valence which are implicit in Lewin's 
use of the concept. Motive is considered to be "a drive 
or disposition to strive for a certain class of satisfac-
tions." It applies equally to all members of the class 
(i.e., an increase in motive increases by an equal ratio 
the valences of all members of the class. Incentive, on 
the other hand, designates the differences in attractive-
ness or unattractiveness among the members of the class. 
Two "motives" are considered: 1) the "motive to achieve 
success" (Ms) and, 2) the "motive to avoid failure" (Mf). 
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Atkinson accepts two assumptions of his predeces-
sors: 1) that the incentive of success (Is) is a positive 
function of the difficulty of the task (i.e., there is more 
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satisfaction in accomplishing something difficult); and 2) 
that the incentive of failure (If) or unattractiveness of 
failure is a negative function of the difficulty of the 
task (i.e., the chagrin at failing on something simple is 
greater). To these assumptions he adds a third, that the 
degree of difficulty can be inferred from the subjective 
probability or expectancy of failure, Pf. Then, making a 
number of implicit mathematical assumptions, he arrives at 
a simple mathematical expression of the interrelationships. 
The subjective probability of failure, Pf, is treated as 
the difference between P and 1: Pf equals 1-P . Since 
s . s 
the incentive value of success, Is, is treated as a 
positive, linear function of difficulty and difficulty is 
inferred from the subjective probability of failure, Pf, 
that Is equals Pf or 1-Ps. The negative incentive, If, 
equals -Ps. The variables are summated to obtain a 
"resultant motivation" in a manner equivalent to Lewin in 
obtaining his "resultant weighted valence" and the deci-
sion theorist's "subjective expected utility." Motivation 
to achieve success (approach) : Ms x Ps xIs. Motivation 
to avoid failure (avoidance) : Mf x Pf x If. The resultant 
motivation is the difference between approach and avoidance. 
This is illustrated in the table below. It should be re-
membered that Is, If, and Pf are derived from Ps. Thus, the 
formula might be reduced to: Resultant Mot .• (Ms-Mf)(Ps)(l-Ps). 
Task A 
B 
E 
G 
I 
TABLE 1.1 
MOTIVATION TO ACHIEVE (APPROACH) AND TO AVOID FAILURE (AVOIDANCE) AS A JOINT FUNCTION OF MOTIVE (M), 
EXPECTANCY (P), AND INCENTIVE (I) 
Motivation to Achiev~ Motivation to Avoid Failure Resultant Motivation 
Ms x Ps x Is • Approach Mf X Pf X If • Avoidance Approach - Avoidance 
- - -
- -
1 .10 .90 .09 2 .90 -.10 -.18 -.09 
1 .20 .so .16 2 .so -.20 -. 32 -.16 
1 .50 .50 .25 2 .50 -.50 -.50 -.25 
1 .70 . 30 .21 2 . 30 -.70 -.42 -.21 
1 .90 .10 .09 2 .10 -.90 -.18 -.09 
N 
(..J 
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Two correlaries, which may be derived from this model, are 
evident in the table. The first is that both the motivation 
to approach and the motivation to avoid are greatest in the 
middle range of difficulty where the probability if 50-50. 
The second is that where the motive to succeed dominates, 
the subject should prefer the middle of the range, and where 
the motive to avoid failure dominates (as illustrated in the 
table), the subject should avoid the middle of the range and 
choose either extreme. 
c. Risk 
1. Individual Differences in Decision Making under 
Conditions of Risk Considered as a Personality 
Trait. 
This study is concerned with differences in risk-
taking behavior as reflections of differences in the person-
ality traits which are hypothesized to typify schizophrenics 
as opposed to normals. Individual differences in decision 
making under risk have been often of only secondary concern 
in decision theory studies, which have focused on universal 
relationships between stimulus and response variables. 
Coombs and Beardslee20 speak of "utility for risk" which is 
20coombs, C.H. and Beardslee, D., On Decision-Making 
tinder Uncertainty, Ch. 17 of Decision Processes, Thrall, 
Coombs, Davis, (Ed.), New York, Wiley, 1954. 
25 
a liking to gamble or willingness to take a risk and "plays 
an important role in comparison between individuals," but 
which is a "suppressed variable" since there are "no assump-
tions which permit comparing utilities or psychological 
probabilities between individuals." Nogee21 used a person-
ality variable "preferred risk-level of an individual," 
which he considers to be related to Frenkel-Brunswik's con-
cept of "intolerance for ambiguity" and Kline's "tolerance 
vs. resistance to the unstable." He developed an inventory 
to measure this in terms of verbal preference for risks in 
job and gambling situations and compared it to relative 
risk level for hands preferred in a game of cards. 
Edwards, 22 although concerned with the characteristics of 
subjective probability and utility per se rather than dif-
ferences between individuals or groups, measured 
"probability preference" varying both probability and value 
and holding the objective expected value constant. Ziller23 
measured "utility for risk," based on guessing behavior on a 
21Nogee, P., Experimental Studies of Behavior in 
Risk-Takin~ Situations, doctoral dissertation, Harvard 
Univ., Cam ridge, Mass., 1952. 
22Edwards, w., Probability-Preference in Gambling, 
Amer. J. Psychology, 1953, 66, 349-364. 
23ziller, R.C., Vocational Choice and Utility for 
Risk, J. Counseling Psychology, 1957, 4, 61-64. 
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multiple choice achievement test, and related it to area of 
vocational choice. This appears similar to Guilford's 
measure of "carefulness" discussed by Eysenck. 24 Lewin ~ al. 25 
observed that "goal discrepancy scores" reflect a readiness 
to take risks, which in turn reflect an attitude towards 
failure: 
Lowering the values of the failure scale means psy-
chologically being less afraid of failure. This would 
tend to move the resultant valence and therefore the 
goal-line up relative to the achievement, resulting 
in high positive discrepancy scores. In other words, 
the relative weight of the success and failure scale 
determine what is usually called the readiness of the 
individual to take risks or to be cautious. 
Other level of aspiration theorists, including Atkinson and 
Jost, are in basic agreement with this. 
2. Definition of Risk 
To this point we have used the concept of risk with-
out clearly defining it. Luce and Raiffa26 use it categori-
cally, speaking of decision making under risk "if each 
action leads to one of a set of possible specific outcome, 
24Eysenck, H.J. The Structure of Human Personality, 
New York, Wiley, 1953, p. 307. 
25Lewin, K., loc. cit. 
--
26 . Luce, R.D., Raiffa, H., Games and Dec1.sions: 
Introduction and Critical Survey, New York, W1.iey, 1957. 
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each outcome occurring with a known probability," as opposed 
to uncertainty, "If either action or both has as its conse-
quences a set of possible specific outcomes, but where the 
probabilities of these outcomes are completely unknown or 
are not even meaningful," and certainty, "if each action is 
known to lead invariably to a specific outcome." 
Although it is possible, in considering individual 
differences in risk-taking as a personality trait, to think 
of risk as a two-point scale (risk, no-risk) upon which 
individuals may vary on a continuum of strength of prefer-
ence or aversion to one of the points; a continuum of risk 
appears to be often implied. Nogee' s term "preferred risk 
level" implies such a continuum. In his inventory he pro-
vides choices among three levels varying in certainty of 
success, amount of possible reward, and amount of possible 
loss, emphasizing in his discussion the element of 
certainty vs. uncertainty. Lewin and Atkinson consider the 
level of difficulty of the goal for the individual, thus 
the probability of success and failure, to represent a scale 
or risk. Atkinson, however, points out that both ends of 
the probability continuum approach certainty, while the out-
come at the 50% probability level is least certain. Turning 
to Webster;7 we find risk defined as "hazard, peril, exposure 
1956. 
27webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Springfield, 
to loss or injury." Webster notes that it is used as a 
technical term in the insurance business in several ways: 
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a) "chance of loss," b) "amount which the company may lose," 
c) that which is insured, and d) the character of the 
hazard ("as war risk, fire risk," etc.) For the purpose 
of this dissertation it seems best to define risk as the 
product of the probability of loss or failure and the amount 
or value of the possible loss. It is the negative term, 
-p'L, in the expected value formula and is equivalent to 
Lewin's weighted valence of failure. With this definition 
of risk it is possible to have choices equal in expected 
value but differing in level of risk. It will be considered 
as the operational definition of the clinical concept 
"threat of failure." This conception of risk would seem to 
encompass our usual notion of a choice being "risky" either 
because it is a "long shot" or the stakes are high. 
Experimental Evidence re~ardinf the Behavior of 
Pathological Grou~s in ituat ons involving 
the rrreat of Failure 
A. Level of Aspiration Studies 
1. On Pathological Groups in General 
Assuming that the motive to avoid failure may be 
equated with anxiety and psychopathology, Atkinson's model 
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predicts an observation made in many clinical experiments 
involving the level of aspiration that pathological groups 
have more scores at both extremes than do the normal 
groups. His model does not predict, however, what indi-
viduals are more likely to go to which extreme. This is 
left to be handled by more clinical concepts. Atkinson 
supports the predictions of his model as follows: 
In recent years there has been something of a rebirth 
in interest in the problems of level of aspiration, 
particularly in pathological groups. The tendence for 
anxious groups to show much greater variability in 
level of aspiration, setting their goals either very 
high or very low relative to less anxious persons, was 
noted in early studies by Sears, Rotter, and others. 
Miller, Himmelweit, and Eysenck and Himmelweit have 
produced substantial evidence that persons with 
affective disorders (neurasthenia or dysthymia) 
typically set extremely high goals for themselves; 
hysterics, on the other hand, show a minimal level 
of aspiration, often setting their future goal even 
below the level of past performances. In all of these 
studies, normal control groups have fallen between 
these two extremes, as might be expected from the 
present model if normals are relatively more positive 
in their motivation in achievement-related situations. 
• • • Typically groups of persons for whom the infer-
ence of greater anxiety about failure seems justified 
on the basis of some personality assessment show a 
much greater variance in level of aspiration than 
persons whose motivation is inferred to be more normal 
and less anxious. When the details of behavior are 
examined, it turns out that they are setting their 
aspiration level either defensively high or defensively 
low. 
2. On Schizophrenics 
Jost28 reports finding a "greater frequency of ex-
tremely high (negative and positive) goal discrepancy 
28Jost, K.C., loc. cit. 
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scores among schizophrenic patients than among normal sub-
jects." He interprets the directions of the discrepancies 
thus: 
In the case of the high, negative goal-discrepancy 
score the subject attempts to reduce the probability 
of failure and/or increase the probability of suc-
cess by setting low explicit goals. The high, 
positive goal-discrepancy score, on the other hand, 
is interpreted as a compensatory attempt on the part 
of the subject to bolster his self-esteem. 
Evidence regarding the level of aspiration of the 
paranoid schizophrenic is summarized by Rabin and King29 
who state, "the paranoid's devotion to high attainment are 
borne out by some of Miller's findings as well. Windner 
also found that the prediction of 'high attainment which 
would exceed the actual achievement' is more character-
istic of paranoid than of non-paranoid schizophrenics." 
Jost refers to similar findings by Hausmann, but failed 
to find them himself. Examining Miller's data, 30 we see 
that his paranoid group does not appear to deviate very 
impressively in the direction of high attainment from his 
control group. 
29Rabin, A.I., and King, G.F., op. cit., p. 256. 
30 Miller, D., loc. cit. 
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B. Decision Theory Studies on Schizophrenia 
Only two decision theory studies utilizing patho-
logical groups have come to the attention of the writer. 
Both of these have utilized schizophrenics. Ashman31 
compares schizophrenics with controls on the learning of 
"patterned probability events." This appears to have 
little or no relevance to our theorizing on risk prefer-
ence. Lieberman32 examines the deviation of schizophrenics 
and controls from the expected value model (which is 
treated as the criterion of rational behavior) at various 
levels of probability. In a set of dice games in this 
study pairs of subjects (either two schizophrenics or 
two normals) bid against each other for the opportunity 
to take bets of varying expected values. The highest bid 
for the bet was used to estimate the subjective probability 
which was compared with the objective probability of the 
bet. In separate games subjects competed to obtain the 
right to take bets of positive expected value and to 
32Lieberman, B. 
in Win and Loss 
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avoid taking bets of negative expected value. Some of the 
results were: The adherence to the rational model was 
fairly close for both schizophrenics and normal subjects. 
However, the schizophrenic subjects tended to deviate 
further from the model than normals. Both groups adhered 
more closely to the model in the loss game than in the win 
game. There was a tendency to overestimate the likelihood 
of events whose probabilities were .01 and .05 and to 
underestimate when the probabilities were in the range from 
.25 to .99. Only in the game with the negative expected 
value did any of the pairs of subjects fail to complete the 
game. 
It does not appear that the results of this study 
have a direct bearing on our hypotheses concerning levels 
of risk preference. It might appear that over- and under-
bidding reflect preferences for various probability levels. 
However, the fact that the situation was complex involving 
two subjects competing against each other and that the 
gambles at different levels were not presented simultaneously 
so that a preference could be expressed directly, makes 
interpretation of over- and under-bidding as an expression 
of probability preference quite tenuous. Since the schizo-
phrenic group was not divided into diagnostic sub-categories, 
no information regarding differences between paranoids and 
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non-paranoids is available. The failure of more schizo-
phrenic pairs than normal pairs to complete the game with 
the negative expected value appears to be consonant with 
the theory that schizophrenics are likely to withdraw from 
situations threatening loss or failure. 
CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Summary of Formulations Derived from the 
Review of the Literature 
In the review of the theories of schizophrenia we 
arrived at the formulation that the schizophrenic reaction 
represents a withdrawal from the threat of failure which 
results in varying degrees of deficit in mental functioning. 
Withdrawal, depending upon whether it takes the form of a 
simple avoidance or is expressed as denial of the existence 
of the threat, should lead to the choice of the lower or 
upper extreme of risk conceived as a continuum of threat of 
failure. If the deficit in mental functioning is not so ex-
treme that only random responding results, then schizophren-
ics are likely to select extreme choice as a result of over-
simplifying the stimulus, reacting to only one aspect of it. 
Thus, as a result of both withdrawal and a deficit in mental 
functioning, it would be expected that the schizophreni~in 
situations involving the threat of failure ar,e more likely to 
make extreme choices than normal individuals and are cor-
respondingly less likely to select items representing the 
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middle of the range. Of the schizophrenics, it would be 
expected that the paranoids, who are able to deny the 
existence of threat by projecting the blame for failure, 
would be the ones more likely to choose the alternatives 
representing the greater threat of failure. The discus-
sion of the nature of the threat of failure suggested the 
data might be analyzed to answer several questions about 
what kinds of risks are most threatening to the schizo-
phrenic (e.g., whether there is a threat of a definite loss 
or only of not succeeding, whether it involves achievement 
or chance factors beyond the individual's control, whether 
it is in the area of work or play, whether the situation 
is "real" or only hypothetical, whether it involves inter-
personal relationships or not.) 
Two theoretical models dealing with decision making 
in situations involving the threat of failure were examined. 
They were shown to be basically similar in their formula-
tion. However, in level of aspiration theory probability 
and incentive are intrinsically inseparable and the motive 
is achievement, while in the decision theory studies the 
probability and the reward are independent and the motive 
is economic gain rather than achievement. Various uses of 
preference for risk as a personality trait were noted and 
"risk" was defined for the purpose of this study as the 
"product of the probability of loss or failure and the 
amount or value of the possible loss or failure." This 
represents the negative term of the expected value model, 
p'L. Risk is considered to be operationally equivalent 
to "threat of failure." Choices of equal expected value 
may differ in level of risk. 
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Evidence was presented indicating that there are 
both similarities and differences in behavior on level of 
aspiration measures and strictly gambling or chance taking 
measures. Also evidence was presented to indicate that on 
level of aspiration studies schizophrenics more frequently 
choose the extremes and that paranoids, at least on some 
studies, choose the upper extreme. No immediately relevant 
evidence was found, however, in the decision theory studies 
of gambling behavior. 
Statement of Problem 
The primary aim of this study is to test hypotheses 
which have received some support in level of aspiration 
studies, by means of risk-taking measures based on decision 
theory. If these hypotheses are supported, it would indi-
cate that their validity is not restricted to level of 
aspiration measures. In addition, it would lend added 
weight to the assertion that level of aspiration and chance-
taking behavior have many features in common. 
This study also sought to shed further light on 
the differing effects of various kinds of risk. To this 
end a variety of risk-taking measures have been used and 
the data h~been analyzed to answer questions regarding 
possible differences and to determine whether schizo-
phrenics differ from normals on measures of risk in ways 
other than those anticipated. 
Since fear or anxiety and denial have played 
important roles in our theorizing, auxiliary paper and 
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pencil tests which have been used to measure "manifest 
anxiety" and "denial," as well as a Self-RatingQiolestionnai.re of 
Luck, were included as exploratory additions to the study 
to determine whether they might serve as possible pre-
dictors of risk-taking behavior. 
Statement of HyPotheses and Predictions 
A. HyPotheses 
1. Schizophrenics respond to situations involv-
ing risk by some form of withdrawal from the threat of 
failure. 
2. Paranoid schizophrenics will respond to situa-
tions involving risk by a denial of the threat of failure. 
B. Predictions 
1. On measures of risk-taking schizophrenic 
subjects will choose less frequently than control 
subjects alternatives representing a middle level of 
risk. 
2. On measures of risk-taking paranoid 
schizophrenic subjects will choose more frequently 
than non-paranoid schizophrenic subjects altern-
atives representing a high level of risk. 
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CHAPTER III 
METIIOD 
Groups of schizophrenic subjects (paranoid and 
non-paranoid) and control subjects were given several 
measures of risk-taking behavior. These were a set of three 
dice games and a risk preference inventory. Auxiliary tests 
were administered as well. A total of 70 subjects, 35 
schizophrenics and 35 controls, were used in the experiment. 
Measures 
A. Dice Games 
1. Cons true tion 
A pair of dice was chosen as the chance 
producing vehicle because of its simplicity and 
flexibility. By determining which sums of a pair 
of dice represent winning and losing an experimenter 
can stipulate bets at 1/36 or approximately 3% 
intervals throughout the range of probability from 
.00 to 1.00. 
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1 Edwards, using a pinball machine with eight 
slots had been restricted to eight levels 1/8 (.125) 
apart (i.e., p • 1/2, 2/8 .... 8/8). Atkinson, 
presumably using a single die, had been restricted 
to levels 1/6 apart. Lieberman, replicating the 
Preston and Baratta study, used their levels: .01, 
.05, .25, .50, .75, .95, .99 (the .01 and .99 require 
a double throw of the dice). Since there appeared 
to be no standard levels or any a-priori way of 
determining psychologically equal intervals, the 
probability levels used for this study were chosen 
in the following manner. The levels 1/36 and 35/36 
(or approximately .03 and .97) were chosen as the 
most extreme levels, approaching but not reaching 
certainty, that could be produced by a single throw 
of the dice. 18/36 (.50) was chosen as the middle 
position. In addition two levels between .03 and 
.50 and two levels between .50 and .97 seemed suf-
ficient to produce a reasonably fine gradation. 
These were chosen by attempting to produce equal 
intervals in incentive in terms of Atkinson's 
1Edwards, w., Probability-Preference in Gambling, 
J. Psychology, 1953, 66, 349-364. 
model [p (1-p)} •2 Thus, the levels 4/18, 8/18, 
28/18, 32/18 were chosen. We do not assume, 
however, that our intervals on the probability 
scale really are subjectively equal. The levels 
were described to the subject in terms of the 
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3 nearest percent (3%, 11%, 22%, 50%, 78%, 89%, 97%). 
Simple monetary values to the nearest dollar4 were 
then Chosen, which when associated with the exact 
probability level would approximate an expected 
value of $10. 5 The complexity of the multiplica-
tion appears to have been sufficient to prevent 
subjects who might have done so from calculating 
the slight differences in expected values which 
existed. 
Two of the dice games were modeled directly 
after Edwards6 probability preference games in which 
2see Chapter I, pp. 21-22. 
3For numbers used to produce these probability 
levels see Appendix A. 
4All monetary values are in terms of the play money 
used in the Dice Games. 
5see Table 3.1. 
6 Edwards, W., Amer. J. Psychology, loc. £!!. 
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subjects were offered choices between pairs of bets 
equal in expected value in a paired comparisons 
design. With seven levels of probability 21 pairs 
of bets were needed for each bet to be paired with 
every other bet. In the first game (EV+) the ex-
pected value was +$10. In this game if the subject 
won he would win a certain amount and if he lost he 
would lose nothing. In the second game (EV-) the 
expected value of each bet was -$10. In this game 
if the subject won he would win nothing; if he lost 
he would lose a stated amount. The pairs of the 
first game were replicated making a total of 42 
items and these were mixed randomly with the items 
of the second game. 7 In this manner the two games 
combined had a positive expected value (+ $210) and 
the losses were spaced so that subjects would be 
less likely to withdraw entirely from the game. 
In the third game (EVO) the probability 
was held constant at the .50 level and the expected 
value was zero. Subjects had on each bet equal 
chances of winning or losing the same amount. Bets 
7see Appendix B. Another game with E.V. : 0 was 
developed in which the subject could both win and lose vary-
ing amounts but this was dropped as too confusing for many 
subjects. 
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TABLE 3.1 
LEVELS OF PROBABILITY AND ASSOCIATED PAYOFFS 
In Terms of Exact Probability 
Level Exact Prob. E~l-E) Interval Pa~off ExEected Valu1 
1 1/36 or .0278 .027 
.072 $360 $10.00 
2 4/36 .111 .099 
.074 $ 90 $10.00 
3 8/36 .222 .173 
.077 $ 45 $10.00 
4 18/36 .500 .250 
.077 $ 20 $10.00 
5 28/36 .778 .173 
.074 $ 13 $10.10 
6 32/36 .889 .099 
.072 $ 11 $ 9. 77 
7 35/36 .972 .027 ~ 10 $ 9. 72 
In Terms of Stated Probability 
Level Stated Prob. E~l-El Interval ExEected Val1 
1 .03 .029 
.069 $10.80 
2 .11 .098 
.074 $ 9.90 
3 .22 .172 
.078 $ 9.90 
4 .50 .250 
.078 $10.00 
5 .78 .172 
.074 $10.13 
6 .89 .098 
.069 $ 9.79 
7 .97 .029 ~ 9. 70 
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differed in the amounts which could be won or lost. 
The same seven monetary levels were used in this 
game as in the previous two games. The paired 
comparisions design was used producing 21 combina-
tions of pairs. 
In the second and third games the order of 
presentation of bets within pairs was randomized; 
in the first game, in which the pairs were repli-
cated, the orders were balanced. 
2. Administration 
a) Materials: 1) Pair of dice and dice 
cup; 2) Play money ($3000 bankro118 for the sub-
ject and a larger indeterminate amount for the 
experimenter); 3) 24 3 x 5 stimulus cards contain-
ing one pair of bets per card; 4) Reference card9 
8The $3000 was composed of the following denomina-
tions: lOx$1; lOx$5; lOx$10; 12x$20; Sx$50; 7x~l00; 3x$500. 
This amount was chosen as large enough so that the game 
could not be disrupted by the subject losing all or nearly 
all of his money yet small enousdl so .that it would not ap-
pear to be a fantastic sum or the possible losses or 
winnings insignificant by comparison. The largest single 
win or loss ~360, is 12% of the bankroll. With a 
theoretically average outcome of the experimental game of 
$3210 the outcome was infrequently more than $4000 or less 
than $2000. The range was from $1549 to $5900. In addi-
tion subjects were required to keep all of their money 
together in order that variations in capital on betting 
behavior would be minimized. 
9see Appendix A. 
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(for the subject); 5) Data record sheet10 (for the 
experimenter); 6) Cigarettes and candy. 
b) Procedure: A practice game11 with 
verbal instructions12 was used to teach the subject 
the procedure of the game. The subject was told 
that the first dice game was a practice game in 
which he would "win" a package of cigarettes (or 
an equivalent amount of candy) no matter how the 
game turned out. He was given a bankroll of $3000. 
The reference card was explained to the subject as 
picturing the different chances he would have of 
winning and losing bets in the game and the amounts 
he could win or lose, and stating what numbers he 
could win or lose on at each level of chance. 
Particular note was taken of the 50% level on 
which chances of winning and losing were equal 
although there were only five numbers on which one 
could win and six on which one could lose. The 
10see Appendix B. 
1~e practice game consisted of 40 items (about 
1/2 of the experimental game). 
12This appeared to be a more effective and flexible 
method than formal written instructions for explaining pro-
cedures to individuals differing considerably in their cog-
nitive capacities. 
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reason for this was briefly explained. 13 The sub-
ject was told that in the first game (i.e., games 
1 and 2 combined) he would be given choices between 
pairs of bets and that on some he could win certain 
amounts if he won but would lose nothing if he lost 
while on other pairs he would lose certain amounts 
if he lost but would win nothing if he won (would 
just avoid losing money). At the time the first 
card with the first pair of bets was presented, it 
was explained to the subject that he was expected 
to choose between bet "A" and bet "B." The card 
was interpreted by the experimenter to the subject 
in terms of whether he could win money or lose 
money on the bets, on which he was more likely to 
win (or lose), and on which bet he could win 
(or lose) the greater amount. He was requested to 
make a choice and then roll the dice to determine 
the results of his choice. The payoff (if any) was 
then made. The pairs of bets (including both those 
13The use of the circle graphs on the reference 
card to represent the probability levels was intended to 
concretize and making more comprehensible the conception of 
probability, especially for the schizophrenic subjects. In 
general care was taken to present the details of the bets 
as fully and comprehensibly as possible in order that choices 
between bets would result as fully as possible from risk 
preferences. Subjects were not told, however, that the 
pairs of bets were equal in (expected) value, since this 
might have resulted in an attitude of indifference in choos-
ing. 
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with positive and negative expected value) were 
thus interpreted to the subject in terms of the 
relative chances and payoffs until the subject 
appeared able to comprehend and follow the pro-
cedure without help. Upon completion of the first 
part of the practice game, the subject was intro-
duced to a second part (i.e., third game) with 
an explanation that it was similar to the first 
part except that the chances of winning and losing 
were always 50-50 and that thus he had a choice 
between equal chances of winning or losing a 
smaller amount or winning or losing a larger 
amount. The interpretation of one card was usually 
sufficient. At the close of the game the subject 
counted his capital. 
At the beginning of the experimental game 
proper the subject was told that the amount he won 
would depend on the results of the game. He would 
receive one cigarette (or an equivalent in candy) 
for every $100 he possessed at the end of the game. 
Thus his bankroll of $3000 was worth 30 cigarettes. 
The procedure was reviewed briefly and the experi-
mental game was played in the same manner as the 
practice game. 
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B. Risk Preference Inventory 
1. Construction 
The Risk Preference Inventory is an elabo-
ration of the Test for Preferred Risk-Level previ-
ously constructed by Nogee. 14 The Test for 
Preferred Risk-Level is composed of 12 items each 
containing three alternatives varying in risk 
level, from which the subjects were expected to 
choose the one most preferred. The risk level 
could be varied by varying the certainty of suc-
cess and amount of possible loss and the alterna-
tives made approximately equal in expected value 
by varying the amount of possible reward. Thus 
one may state a-priori the ordinal position that 
each of the three alternatives held relative to 
the other two. 
The Risk Preference Inventory15 was 
constructed by utilizing the structure of the 
Test for Preferred Risk-Level and the content of a 
1~ogee, P., Experimental Studies of Behavior in 
Risk-Taking Situations, doctoral dissertation, Harvard 
Univ., Cam ridge, Mass., 1952. 
15see Appendix D. 
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number of the items and adding to this a number 
of additional items. Of the 41 items used in the 
Inventory six judges agreed on ordinal positions 
(Lo, Mid, Hi) of the alternatives of all but one 
item, and the agreement on that item was five out 
of six. Ambiguous items were eliminated. Later 
one item (no. 3) was eliminated from the scoring 
since it appeared to be qualitatively unique. 
In construction of the Inventory effort was made 
to produce items for two sub-scales: one repre-
senting risk-taking in work situations, the other, 
risk-taking in games of chance. Of 19 work items 
and 12 gambling items there was universal agree-
ment on category among five judges on all but 
three game items (on these the agreement was four 
out of five). This provides an average of 98% 
agreement per item. Two other categorizations 
were developed at the time the data was being 
analyzed: Chance (in which the individual cannot 
influence the outcome) vs. Achievement (where skill 
may effect the outcome) and Interpersonal vs. Non-
interpersonal situations. The former category 
overlaps to a very high degree the work vs. game 
divisions. Of the 26 items used in the chance vs. 
achievement classifications eight judges agreed 
completely on ten items, with one dissention on 
twelve items, and with two dissentions on four 
items or an average of 90% agreement per item. 
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Of the 33 items used in the Interpersonal vs. 
Non-interpersonal classification, nine judges 
agreed completely on thirteen items, with one 
dissention on six items, with two dissentions on 
eight items, and with three dissentions on six 
items or an average of 87% agreement per item. 16 
This classification appeared to be more difficult 
to make. 
2. Administration 
a) Materials: 1) 42 5 x 8 cards contain-
ing separately the instructions and the 41 items; 
2) Scoring sheet. 17 
b) Procedure: The directions were pre-
sented to the subject both visually and orally. 
Then the experimenter guided the subject in re-
cording his answers to the first item. 
16see Appendix E. 
1711Part B" of Data Record 2. See Appendix F. 
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c. Auxiliary Tests 
1. Vocabulary subscale of Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale--administered individually in conventional man-
ner. This served as a screening test for all subjects with 
a scaled score of 10 as a lower limit for inclusion. A cut-
ting score of 10 was chosen as a point selective enough to 
provide a reasonable assurance that the subject would have 
the average verbal skill needed for comprehending the ex-
perimental stimuli and not so selective as to restrict the 
sample excessively. 
2. Arithmetic subscale of Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Scale--administered individually in conventional man-
ner. It was administered originally to serve as an addi-
tional screening test but was not ultimately used for this 
purpose. Administration was continued, however, to check 
whether there might be a relationship between arithmetic 
comprehension and betting behavior. 
3. The abbreviated Taylor Manifest Anxiety (TMA) 
Test and the MMPI-K Scales18 were administered as a com-
bined test. The TMA measures the admission of anxiety or 
symptoms of anxiety. In the K-scale the content has been 
18see Appendix G for content of items and Appendix 
F, part A, for scoring. 
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used in the past to measure a denial of anxiety, hostility, 
and other negative feelings and attitudes. These tests 
were added to the experiment as measures which might dis-
criminate between subjects preferring high and low levels 
of risk in a manner similar to that expected of the 
paranoid--non-paranoid dichotomy. 
4. Nogee's Self-Rating questionnaire of Luck19 
was taken without change of content but was changed some-
what in administration and scoring. Where Nogee had re-
quired subjects to check the most applicable of the seven 
statements in the scale, the experimenter required the sub-
jects to check the most applicable, next most applicable, 
least applicable, and next least applicable statements. 
This rating scale was included to see whether there might 
be a realtion between perceiving oneself as "lucky" and 
one's willingness to take risks. With the exception of 
the Vocabulary test which served to screen subjects, how-
ever, all of the auxiliary tests should be viewed as ex-
ploratory additions rather than as essential portions of 
the experiment. 
19see Appendix R for directions, content and 
weights applied to the alternatives and Appendix F, part C, 
for scoring. See also the description of the development 
of the scoring system in Appendix F. 
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Selection of Subjects 
The experimental group was selected from the male 
patient population of the Bedford Veterans Administration 
Hospital. Lists of potential subjects who were in suffi-
cient contact to participate in an experiment were obtained 
from the ward doctors and nurses. The patients' records 
were examined to assure the selection of patients clearly 
diagnosed schizophrenic, chronic (symptoms dating at 
least one year), not over fifty years old, and having no 
history of brain damage. Patients with less than a lOth 
grade education were also dropped since it was found that 
as a rule they could not pass the screening test. All but 
two or three had had at least a year of hospitalization. 
If they co-operated in taking the screening tests and 
obtained a Vocabulary score of 10 or better, they were 
used in the study. 20 
20These selection criteria were found to limit 
severely the supply of subjects for the experimental group. 
Therefore, it proved infeasible to restrict further the 
group to those diagnosed either clearly paranoid or clearly 
non-paranoid. This resulted in ten subjects being classi-
fied as neither clearly paranoid nor clearly non-paranoid 
because they had been previously diagnosed paranoid or were 
reported to have "paranoid trends." These subjects were 
not used in comparisons between paranoid and non-paranoid 
subgroups. 
TABLE 3.2 
EQUATION OF EXPERIMENTAL AND CONTROL GROUPS ON AGE, 
YEARS OF EDUCATION, AND VOCABULARY SCALE SCORE 
Experimental Group Control Group 
Mean S.D. Ranxe Mean S.D. 
- -
Age 35.6 5.8 23-49 36.5 8.0 
Years of Education 13.4 2.6 10-21 13.5 3.3 
Vocabulary Scale Score 13.2 2.5 10-19 13.0 2.6 
Range 
20-50 
8-19 
10-19 
\J1 
+-
55 
The control subjects were male volunteers between 
the ages of twenty and fifty who obtained a score of 10 or 
better on the Vocabulary. Twenty-eight of the controls 
were employees of the Bedford V. A. H. The control group 
was equated with the experimental group on age, years of 
education, and vocabulary score. 
In addition to the status as patients in a mental 
hospital the experimental group subjects differed from 
control group subjects in a number of other ways. Thirty-
two of the thirty-five experimental group subjects were re-
ceiving tranquilizing medications. As a group they were 
unemployed, although some had work assignments within the 
hospital and one worked outside the hospital, while of the 
control group only one, a student, was unemployed at the 
time of testing. All but one of the experimental groups 
were single or separated while only nine of the control 
group were not married. These group differences may be 
considered to be concomitants of schizophrenia. The ex-
tent to which they are related to our measures of risk-
taking behavior is not known. 
General Administrative Procedure 
Subjects were tested individually in a series of 
three sessions taking a total of approximately three hours. 
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In the first session subjects were screened. The 
potential subject was told that he was being asked to 
participate in a study of what kind of chances people pre-
ferred to take and that the main part of the study con-
sisted of several dice games at which he could win cigar-
ettes or candy. However, since he would have to be 
matched with subjects in other groups in various ways, 
there would be a few preliminary tests to determine 
whether he could be used in the study. Whether he was 
used or not did not mean he had done particularly well or 
poorly on the tests. 21 After subjects were asked for 
biographical information (including name, age, amount of 
education, father's occupation), the WAIS Vocabulary and 
Arithmetic tests were administered. This session lasted, 
on the average, 45 minutes. 
In the second session the subject was taught the 
procedure of the experimental game by means of a practice 
game on which he was told he would win a package of cigar-
ettes or an equivalent amount of candy no matter what the 
outcome of the game was. Following the game, the risk pre-
ference inventory and the self rating questionnaire of Luckwere 
21Groups were eguated but not matched. This ruse was 
used to make the reject4on of those subjects who did not meet 
the screening criteria less threatening to their self-esteem. 
administered. The session averaged 1 hour and 15 minutes. 
In the third session the subject was told that the 
amount he would win would be determined by the outcome of 
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the game. The experimental game was then played, following 
which the subject was questioned on his strategy or way of 
playing and on his past gambling experience. The Taylor 
Manifest Anxiety Scale and the MMPI-K Scale were administered. 
At the conclusion of the session, after all measures had 
been administered, the subject was given the opportunity to 
ask any questions he wished concerning the nature of the 
study. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Schizophrenics vs. Controls 
A. Dice Games 
Two basic methods of analysis are employed to ex-
amine differences between the schizophrenic and control 
groups. The first form of analysis consists of examining 
separately the frequencies of choices at each level (com-
bination of probability and amount). From the structure 
of the paired comparisons design the possible range of 
frequency of choice for each level in the E~game is 0-12 
and the mean frequency of all levels combined is 6. For 
the EV-, and EVO games the possible range is 0-6 and the 
mean of all levels combined is 3. This means that an 
individual may choose any given level from 0 to 12 times 
for the EV game and 0 to 6 times for the EV- and EVO 
games. The results of this analysis in terms of difference 
between schizophrenic and control groups in mean fre-
quencies of choices at each level is presented in tables 
4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. Using the 
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Schizophrenics. __________ __ 
Controls ___________ _ 
Level 
*see Table 4.1 for description of bet at each level. 
Level 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
TABLE 4.1 
COMPARISONS OF MEAN FREQUENCIES OF CHOICE BY LEVELS 
BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL GROUPS 
ON THE DICE GAME·WITH A POSITIVE EXPECTED VALUE 
(EV+) 
Mean Freq. 
of Choice d* Description of Bet Schiz. Control 
3% win $360; 97% lose 0 5.9 4.7 7 
11% II $ 90; 89% II 0 5.4 4.2 8 
22% II $ 45; 7.8% II 0 5.7 5.5 3 
50% II $ 20; 50% II 0 5.8 7.4 15 
78% II $ 13; 22% II 0 6.0 6.8 10 
89% II $;1~; 11% II 0 6.2 6.4 2 
97% II $ 10; 3% 1.1 0 6.9 7.2 7 
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1 
tail 
p 
.005 
* d : maximum difference between two cumulative distributions. 
6 
5 
FIGURE 4.2 
COMPARISONS OF MEAN FREQUENCIES OF CHOICE BY LEVELS 
BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL GROUPS 
ON THE DICE GAME WITH A NEGATIVE EXPECTED VALUE (EV-) 
1 2 3 
Schizophrenics ____________ _ 
Controls ___ - _____ - - - -
4 
Level 
5 6 7 
See Table 4.2 for description of bet at each level. 
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Level 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
TABLE 4.2 
COMPARISONS OF MEAN FREQUENCIES OF CHOICE BY LEVELS 
BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL GROUPS 
ON THE DICE GAME WITH A NEGATIVE EXPECTED VALUE 
(EV-) 
Mean Freq. 
of Choice d* Description of Bet Schiz. Control 
3% win 0; 97% lose $ 10 2.4 2.0 6 
11% II 0; 89% II $ 12 2.7 2.4 4 
22% II 0; 78% II $ 13 3.1 2.8 8 
50% II 0; 50% It $ 20 3.8 3.5 4 
78% II 0; 22% II $ 45 3.2 3.5 8 
89% II 0; 11% II $ 90 3.0 3.4 8 
97% II 0; 3% II $360 2.7 3.3 5 
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*d = maximum difference between two cumulative distributions 
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FIGURE 4.3 
COMPARISONS OF MEAN FREQUENCIES OF CHOICE BY LEVELS 
BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL GROUPS 
ON TilE DICE GAME WITH A ZERO EXPECTED VALUE (EVO) 
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See Table 4.3 for description of bet at each level. 
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Level 
A 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
g 
TABLE 4.3 
COMPARISONS OF MEAN FREQUENCIES OF CHOICE BY LEVELS 
BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL GROUPS 
ON THE DICE GAME WITH A ZERO EXPECTED VALUE 
(EVO) 
Mean Freq. 
of Choice d* Description of Bet Schiz Control 
59% win $ 10; 50% lose $ 10 3.3 1.7 11 
50% win$ 11; 50% lose $ 11 2.9 2.4 7 
50% win $ 13; 50% lose $ 13 3.0 2.8 7 
50% win $ 20; 50% lose $ 20 3.2 3.4 6 
50% win $ 45; 50% lose $ 45 3.1 3.7 9 
50% win $ 90; 50% lose $ 90 3.0 3.6 9 
50% win $360; 50% lose $360 2.5 3.2 8 
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2 
tail 
p 
.10 
* d = maximum difference between two cumulative distributions 
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1 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to measure the significance of the 
difference between the distributions, we find that only on 
the middle level of the EV+ game (50% win $20, 50% lose 0) 
is there a significant difference (p •. 005, 1 tail) between 
the preferences of schizophrenic and control groups, with 
the schizophrenics less frequently preferring this level 
than the controls. This provides some confirmation of 
prediction 1. The data indicates a tendency, although not 
significant {pa.lO), for schizophrenic subjects on the EVO 
game to prefer more frequently the extreme choice (50% win 
$10, 50% lose $10) than do the control subjects. 
lrwo statistical tests are used in this study: 
a) the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test, and b) Chi Square 
and its associated contingency coefficient, c. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test is used when the difference between 
two samples is to be tested. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
is based on the largest difference {d) between two cumulative 
distributions. d is reported either in terms of the absolute 
difference for equal samples or in terms of differences in 
per cent for unequal samples. When a test of the presence 
or absence of a correlation between two measures is desired 
the Chi Square and associated contingency coefficient is 
obtained from the distribution reduced to a 2x2 contingency 
table dividing the distributions at their respective medians. 
By using these two non-parametric tests it was possible to 
compare and contrast in a consistent manner a variety of 
small sample distributions varying considerably in form 
with a minimum of statistical assumptions. See Siegel, 
Sidney, No?@Grametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences, 
New York, M raw Rill, 1956. 
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The second method of analysis consists of examining 
trends in individual preferences a) for one extreme as op-
posed to the other extreme of the continuum; b) for the 
middle level as opposed to both extremes. The first measure-
ment is achieved by weighting each level arbitrarily one unit 
higher than the preceeding level (i.e., level 1 (or !) 11011 , 
level 2 (or b) "1", • . • • level 7 (or ,&) "6"). 2 
Level 
Weight 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
By summing an individual's choices of levels thus weighted3 
a score is obtained which reflects the degree to which a sub-
ject consistently prefers one extreme or the other a) low 
score indicating a preference for the level 1 (or a) end and 
a high score indicating a preference of the level 7 (or g) 
~umbers 1 through 7 were used to designate levels 
of probability on the EV and EV- games (i.e., for both 
games 1 indicates 3% chance of winning and 97% chance of 
losing, and 7 indicates 97% chance of winning and 3% chance 
of losing.) Letters a through g were used to designate the 
levels of the EVO game where the probability is held constant 
and only the amounts which could be won or lost were varied. 
3The constant 70 subtracted from scores of the EV+ 
game results in a possible range of scores from 0 to 112; 
35 subtracted from scores of the EV- and EVO results in a 
possible range of 0 to 56. 
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end. These scores will be referred to as HI ~· Lo Scores. 
No significant differences were found between the 
schizophrenic and control group on the distributions of 
Hi ~ Lo scores for any of the games. There appeared to 
be a tendency, however, for schizophrenics to prefer more 
frequently than controls the extreme representing the less 
risky alternatives on the EVO game and the more risky 
alternatives on the EV+ game. This interaction between 
4 groups and measures proved to be significant, which sug-
gests that the presence or absence of an actual loss may 
determine whether schizophrenics are more or less conserva-
tive in taking risks than normals. An examination of the 
distributions of the Hi vs Lo scores revealed that on the 
---
EVO game the scores clustered at the extremes producing a 
distinctly U-shaped distribution. This indicates that sub-
jects frequently played this game in an all-or-none fashion. 
The scores of the EV+ and EV- games produced distributions 
having this tendency only slightly; 
4The test of the interaction was accomplished in the 
following manner: The score of a subject on the EVO game 
was doubled since it was originally composed of half as 
many items as the EV+ game. Then, in order to measure the 
differential reaction of a subject to the two games, his two 
scores were added, since the scales of these two games as 
measures of risk run in opposite directions. The difference 
between the cumulative distributions on the resulting scores 
for schizophrenics and controls was subjected to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test-~ d • 16, p • .005, 2 tail. 
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The measurement of preference for middle vs. extreme levels 
is accomplished in a manner similar to the one just described. 5 
To obtain a low score on this scale (indicating a prefer-
ence for extreme levels), the individual need not be con-
sistent in the choice of one or the other of the extremes. 
In this case the weightings are: 
Level 
Weight 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 1 2 3 2 1 0 
Table 4.4 reveals that the distributions of Mid ~· Extreme 
scores for the schizophrenic and control subjects differ 
significantly (p:.005, 1 tail) for the EV+ game but are 
not significantly different for the EV- and EVO games. On 
the EV+ game the schizophrenics less frequently prefer the 
middle levels as opposed to the extremes than do the con-
trols. This supports prediction 1. 
Interrelationships among the dice games, examined 
by calculating the contingency coefficients of the Hi ~ ~ 
scores of each game dichotomized at the medians, are shown 
on table 4.5. The Hi ~ Lo score reflects the overall 
5The constant of 26 is subtracted from scores of the 
EV+ game resulting in a possible range of scores from 0 to 
56; 13 is subtracted from EV- and EVO games resulting in a 
possible range of scores from 0 to 28. 
TABLE 4.4 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL 
GROUPS ON THE MID vs EXTREME SCORES AND THE HI vs 
LO SCORES OF THE DICE GAMES 
Diff. of 
Median Medians d* Schiz. Control c-s 
Mid vs Extreme Score 
EVt game 27 31 +-4 14 
EV- game 17 16 -1 4 
EVO game 14 15 +1 6 
Hi vs Lo Score 
EVt- game 62 73 +11 7 
EV- game 30 36 +6 6 
EVO game 26 43 +17 10 
-
1 
tail 
p 
.005 
* d = maximum difference between two cumulative distributions. 
0\ 
co 
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TABLE 4.5 
INTERCORRELATIONS AMON:; THE HI vs LO SCORES OF THE 
DICE GAMES AND GAMBLING WEIGHTED SCORE 
EV+ with EVO 
EV+ with EV-
EVO with EV-
Inventory Gambling 
Score with 
EV+ 
EVO 
EV-
OF THE RISK PREFERENCE 
INVENTORY 
1 tail 
9.66 
.90 
.03 
3.68 
4.72 
.23 
p 
.001 
.028 
.015 
Contingency 
Coefficient 
• 35 
.22 
.25 
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tendency of a subject to choose a high or low level of risk 
on a particular game. The scores of the EVt and EVO games 
are significantly related (C: .35). The EV- game is not 
significantly related to either the EV+ or EVO game, which 
suggests that the EV- game is not measuring the same be-
havior as the other two games. 
B. Inventory 
The analysis of the Inventory may proceed in a 
manner similar to that of the dice games except that only 
three levels are involved (Lo, Mid, Hi) as opposed to seven, 
and there are two kinds of responses "most prefer" and "least 
prefer." Three sorts of analyses of the total inventory are 
feasible for examining difference between schizophrenic and 
control groups: a) examine frequencies of choice at each 
level in terms of each kind of response separately; b) ex-
amine each level by subtracting the frequency of "least 
prefer" from '.'most prefer" responses to obtain an estimate 
of the degree of "net" preference for that level; c) develop 
a weighted score representing the individuals' overall level 
of risk preference similar to the Hi ~ b£ scores of the 
dice games. This may be achieved by arbitrarily weighting 
responses thus: 
Most Prefer 
Least Prefer 
Lo 
0 
2 
Risk Level 
Mid 
1 
1 
Hi 
2 
0 
From table 4.6 it may be observed that the schizophrenic 
subjects more frequently prefer the Lo risk level while 
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the controls more frequently prefer the; middle level. Both 
groups tend to reject the Hi risk level. The total weighted 
score does not differentiate significantly either in terms 
of direction or deviation from the median6 between schizo-
prenics and controls. Since there are only three levels, 
mid vs. extreme comparisons are measured by responses to the 
mid level. 
Table 4.7 presents evidence found on the influence 
of item content categories on differences in risk-taking 
behavior between schizophrenic and control subjects. The 
weighted scores for each category are examined separately. 
Also differences between pairs of content categories are 
6The test of the tendency for controls to choose 
middle levels on the total weighted score was made by rank-
ing deviations from the median in each direction separately 
ana then using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the cumulative 
distributions of the ranks. 
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TABLE 4.6 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL 
GROUPS ON RESPONSE CATEGORIES AND ON THE 
TOTAL WEIGHTED SCORE OF THE 
RISK PREFERENCE INVENTORY 
Mean Freq. Mean 
0~ Diff. 
Choice 
d* Schiz. Control c-s 2 
Lo Risk 
Most Prefer 18.0 14.0 -4.0 12 .05 a 
Least Prefer 11.3 13.9 +2.6 10 
Net: 
Most-Least +6.7 +0.1 -6.6 13 .05 a 
Mid Risk 
Most Prefer 13.7 17.2 t3.5 11 .05 b 
Least Prefer 6.2 3.7 -2.5 11 .05 b 
Net: 
Most-Least +7.5 +13.5 t6.0 13 .01 b 
Hi Risk 
Most Prefer 8.4 8.9 +0.5 3 
Least Prefer 22.6 22.5 -0.1 4 
Net: 
Most-Least -14.1 -13.6 +0.6 4 
Total Weighted Scoret 
57.4 61.4 +-4.0 8 
* d : maximum difference between two cumulative distributions. 
a: two tail test. b: one tail test. 
t the reliability of this score is estimated to be .83. 
TABLE 4.7 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE CONTROL GROUPS 
ON THE RISK PREFERENCE INVENTORY WEIGHTED SUB-SCORES 
2 
No. of Median d* tail Items Schiz. Control p 
work 19 30 41 11 .10 
Gambling 12 14 17 7 
work-19/12 Gambling +7 +13 10 
Achievement 16 24 33 14 .01 
Chance 10 11 13 6 
Achievement-16/10 Chance +7 +14 13 .05 
Interpersonal 16 25 28 8 
Non-Interpersonal 17 23 26 5 
Interpers.-Non-Interpers. -1 +1 9 
Conformitz Score +9 +13 14 .01 
* -..! d :maximum difference between two cumulative distributions. w 
74 
examined by subtracting the individual's weighted score 
in one category from his score in the other. 7 The results 
indicate that the schizophrenic subjects take significantly 
less risk in the "achievement" situations than do the 
controls. The preference for taking risks in the achieve-
ment situations over taking risks in the chance situations 
is also significantly less for the schizophrenic subjects 
than for the control subjects. The results of the closely 
related pair of categories, work vs. gambling, are in the 
same direction but are not significant. There is no indica-
tion that the distinction between interpersonal vs. 
non-interpersonal situation effects risk taking on this 
inventory. 
From Table 4.5 we may note that the weighted score 
of the Gambling subscale of the Inventory correlates sig-
nificantly with the EV+ and EVO Dice games but not with the 
EV- game. This is another indication that the EV- game is 
not a measure consistent with the other measure of risk-
taking. 
In an item analysis of the Inventory the number of 
items which differentiated "significantly" between 
7Where a considerable discrepancy existed in the 
number of items composing a pair of categories, the smaller 
category was multiplied by an appropriate constant so that 
it could be treated as though it had as many items as the 
larger category. 
schizophrenics and controls was only as many as might have 
been expected by chance. However, in observing responses 
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to individual items the experimenter noted that there were 
some responses which subjects of both groups made nearly 
universally and some responses which were very rarely made. 
This suggested that it might be possible to construct a 
measure of conformity to the group standard of behaviorS 
toward risk-taking on the Inventory and that this might 
represent an empirically determined implicit social standard 
of rationality similar in design to the Kuder V score. This 
measure was constructed by rating response categories 
chosen 11 times or less out of a possible 70 as rare 
response categories and response categories chosen 47 or 
more times out of a possible 70 as popular response cate-
gories.9 This resulted in 56 response categories rated rare 
and 20 rated popular. 10 
Bwe have used the term "group" to mean only a 
statistical aggregate or sample, not a social entity. "Group 
standard" means only the aggregate of those resPtonses made 
by most of the individuals in this sample. By 'conformity" 
it is meant that the individual makes many of this aggregate 
of responses. 
9These cut off points were determined by assuming 
that theoretically 70 responses would be expected to dis-
tribute equally over 3 categories (thus 23.3 per category) 
1/2 x 23.3 or 11 and 2 x 23.3 or 47 were chosen as arbitrary 
cut off points. 
10see Appendix E, "C score." 
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Of the 76 response categories used 59 fall into 
two general classifications indicating that the "confonning" 
individual rarely rejects the middle category11 (28 response 
categories) and avoids certain excessive risks12 (31 
response categories) • By SUIIIDing the number of "popular'' 
responses made by the individual subject and subtracting 
the "rare" responses a "confonnity'' score was obtained for 
the individual. The distributions of the scores of the 
schizophrenic and the control subjects differ significantly 
(.01, two tail) with the schizophrenic subjects less con-
fanning, as defined above, than the control subjects. 13 
It was noted on the distribution of scores that the scores 
of 5 or 6 schizophrenics scattered a considerable distance 
from the main body of the distribution in the direction 
of non-confonnity. In separate examinations of those 
responses used in the c-Score representing a rejection of 
the middle level of risk and those representing avoidance 
of certain excessive risks it was found that the distribu-
tions of schizophrenics and controls did not differ sig-
nificantly from one another, but a similar scattering of 
1~able 4.8, cell k. 
12Table 4.8, cells a, f, i, j. 
13Table 4.7. 
Hi 
Popular+ 4 a 
Rare - 5 g 
TABLE 4.8 
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULAR AND RARE RESPONSES BY RESPONSE 
CATEGORIES 
M o 8 t 
Mid 
1 b 
2 h 
Lo 
0 c 
15 i 
Hi 
2 d 
6 j 
L e a 8 t 
Mid 
0 e 
28 k 
Lo 
13 f 
0 m 
" 
" 
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a few deviant schizophrenics was observed. 
C. Auxiliary Tests 
The schizophrenics obtained significantly lower 
scores (d • 12, p • .05 2 tail) than the controls on the 
Arithmetic scale of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test. 
This scale, however, was not found to correlate with any 
of the measures of risk-taking. Thus, it appears reason-
ably safe to assume that for the sample selected ,the vari-
able of arithmetic comprehension did not influence to any 
significant extent the experimental results. 
The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (TMA) and the 
K-Scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
showed a strong intercorrelation (C • .49; p • .001). 
For this reason, as well as the fact that they showed con-
siderable similarity in content, they were combined for 
some comparisons in an attempt to produce a more powerful 
measure. From Table 4.9 it may be noted that the Self 
Rating Questionnaire of Luck is significantly correlated 
with the TMA and with the combined K-TMA. The schizophrenics 
obtained significantly higher scores on the TMA (d • 14, 
p • .01 2 tail) than did the controls, but they did not 
differ significantly from the controls on the K Scale, the 
combined K-TMA, or the Self Rating Questionnaire of Luck. 
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No significant relationships were found between any of 
these measures and either the Inventory or the dice games. 
Thus, it appears that the TMA Scale, the K Scale, and 
the Self Rating Questionnaire of Luck are interrelated 
and they are related to some extent to schizophrenia, 
but that they would not serve as predictors of risk-taking 
behavior. 
Paranoid vs. Non-Paranoid Schizophrenics 
Of the 35 schizophrenic subjects, 12 were diagnosed 
"paranoid" at the time of testing; 13 subjects had never 
been diagnosed paranoid nor reported as having manifested 
"paranoid trends"; and 10 subjects were diagnosed as other 
than paranoid but either had had previous diagnoses of 
"paranoid schizophrenia" or were reported to have manifested 
"paranoid trends." The 12 clearly paranoid subjects were 
not found to take greater risks than the 13 clearly non-
paranoid subjects on any of the measures of risk-taking. 
Some of the data indicated, in fact, a tendency, although 
not significant, for the paranoids to take less risk than 
the non-paranoids. 14 This is in the opposite direction 
14-rhis tendency is found on the EV+ game Hi vs Lo 
score (d : 53%, p = .10 2 tail), on the EVO gameltivs""Lo 
score (d = 52%, p = .10 2 tail), and on the Total-rnventory 
Weighted Score (d • 34%). 
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TABLE 4.9 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SELF RATING QUESTIONNAIRE OF LUCK 
AND TMA SCALE, K SCALE, AND COMBINED K-TMA SCALE 
"Luck" with TMA 3.64 
"Luck" with K 1.40 
"Luck" with K -TMA 5.76 
1 tail 
p 
.03 
.01 
Contingency 
Coefficient 
.22 
• 28 
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from Prediction 2, that paranoid schizophrenics would 
choose the higher levels of risk more frequently than non-
paranoid schizophrenics. 
It was also found that the K Scale of the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, which was used as a 
measure of "denial, 11 did not differentiate between the 
paranoid and non-paranoid subjects. 
CHAPTER V 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Results Related to Predictions 
Prediction 1. On measures of risk-taking schizo-
phrenic subjects will choose less frequently than control 
subjects alternatives representing a middle level of risk. 
This prediction is supported by the more frequent 
choice by control subjects than schizophrenics of the 
middle level of risk as "most" preferred ( p = .05), the 
more frequent choice of the middle level (50% win $20; 
50% lose 0) on the EV+ game (p = .005) and the higher 
scores on the Mid vs. Extreme scores of the controls on 
the EV+ game (p • .005). Also the significantly less fre-
quent choice (p • .05) of the middle level as "lease pre-
ferred" and the higher (p : .01) "net" preference scores 
(most - least) for the middle level by controls than by 
schizophrenics may be interpreted to support the prediction. 
The prediction was not supported in terms of deviation from 
the median score on the Inventory Total Weighted score, nor 
by measures derived from either the EVO game or the EV- game. 
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A possible interpretation of the lack of difference between 
schizophrenics and controls in the frequency of middle 
level scores on the Inventory Total Weighted score is that 
an extreme score requires the consistent choice of one 
extreme. If choices of extremes are inconsistent the 
total score will tend to fall toward the middle. Thus 
it appears that in making extreme choices on the Inventory 
the schizophrenics as individuals are not consistent. The 
lack of support from the EVO and EV- games may be due both 
to the smaller number of iJ::ems and other reasons which will 
be considered later in the discussion of differences 
between the games. 
Prediction 2. On measares of risk-taking paranoid 
schizophrenic subjects will choose more frequently than 
non-paranoid schizophrenic subjects alternatives represent-
ing a high level of risk. 
This prediction received no support. There are a 
number of possible explanations. One, the sample is very 
small. Two, the fact that chronic rather than acute sub-
jects were used may make a difference. Although "paranoid 
trends" may not be listed as a manifestation for many pa-
tients not diagnosed paranoid, the histories of'varying 
diagnoses and the appellation of "undifferentiated" sug-
gests that with increasing chronicity there may be a 
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decreasing d~stinctiveness in manifestation. Three, the 
prediction isl only weakly supported by previous experi-
menters. Jost, as noted in Chapter I, failed to find more 
positive goall discrepancies among his paranoids in his 
level of aspi~ation study. This suggests that the hy-
pothesis may pave been unfounded to begin with. 
Additional Analyses of the Data 
A. to the nature of the risks on which 
norma s er 
I Question 1. Do schizophrenic subjects differ from 
normal subjecis in preference for one or the other of the 
extreme risk-laking? 
The r,sults of the Inventory indicate a signifi-
cantly greatej preference (.05) for (i.e., "most prefer"), 
less rejection (.05) of (i.e., "least prefer"), and a 
greater net pJeference (.01) fora.e., ~ost- least) low 
levels of ris~ by schizophrenics than by control subjects. 
This finding ~eceives some additional support in the tendency, 
not statistically significant, on the EVO game for schizo-
phrenics to gd more frequently to the low extreme on the Hi 
vs. Lo score ~d to choose more frequently the least risky 
bet of that gare (50% win $10; 50% lose $10). These find-
ings are in acford with what one might expect from a 
relatively s;nple, 
loss or failure. 
direct withdrawal from the threat of 
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est on 2. Are there kinds of risk-raking situa-
tions in whic schizophrenic behavior is more sharply 
differentiatetl from the normal than in others-- a) between 
dice games vafying in expected value of the bets? 
This ruestion requires a re-examination of the dif-
ferences betw~en the games in the light of our definition 
of "risk." ri will be recalled that risk was defined as 
the product ot the amount of loss and the probability of 
loss. When w~ apply this to the EV+ game we observe that 
the amount oflloss in each case is zero. Thus we could say 
zero times any probability is zero. There is no risk in-
volved. HoweJer, subjects did not, as a rule, make choices 
wildly as thoqgh there were "nothing to lose." So, failure 
' 
to win can be !treated as having a definite, indeterminate, 
loss value (X). Assuming this is relatively constant for 
I 
all bets, we can determine the order of risk levels for the 
bets: .03X <I .llX < .22X <.SOX < .78X < .97X. 
Thus level 1 (~% win $360; 97% lose O) is the most risky 
bet of the EV+I game and level 7 (97% win $10; 3% lose 0) 
is the least risky. From this we may posit that a low 
numerical scorb on the Hi vs. Lo score of the EV+ game rep-
resents takinglhigh risks. On the EVO game the probability 
level is held fOnstant and the amounts of reward and loss 
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vary. Concerning ourselves with the losses, the order of 
levels of risk go from bet a (.SOx lose $10) to bet & 
(.SOx lose $360). Thus here a high score on the Hi vs. Lo 
score represents taking high risks. On the EV- game, 
which was modeled directly after Edwards before the experi-
menter's concept of risk was fully clarified, the experi-
menter felt that, analogous to paying for insurance, taking 
a more probable chance of a small loss was less risky than 
taking a less probable chance of a large loss. Hmvever, 
in terms of our definition of risk, all levels from .03 x 
lose $360 to .97 x lose $10 are equally risky. Empirical 
support for these interpretations is found in the signifi-
cant intercorrelations among the Hi vs. Lo scores of the 
EV+ game, EVO game, and the Gambling Score of the Inventory, 
and the lack of correlation of the EV- game with any of 
them. This may explain the failure of the EV- game to 
differentiate in any way between schizophrenics and controls. 
The results of the EV+ and EVO games remain to be 
discussed. On the EV+ game the difference between groups in 
the choice of the middle levels of risk is significant, 
but on the EVO game there is no significant difference. 
The lack of differentiation at the middle level on the EVO 
game may result from the fact that the subjects character-
istically go to the extremes on this game. The data indicate 
tendencies for schizophrenics to prefer more often than 
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controls the high levels of risk on the EV+ game and the 
low levels of risk on the EVO game. These tendencies are 
not significant when treated separately but are significant 
(p : .005, 2 tail) when combined and treated as an inter-
action between groups and measures. It may be that the 
schizophrenics are somewhat more influenced by the con-
crete amount of reward and less influenced by the more 
abstract probability of losing nothing than are the controls. 
In contrasting the EV+ and EVO game it appears that the 
presence or absence of a concrete loss may determine whether 
the schizophrenics tend to take more or less risks than the 
controls. The tendency for the schizophrenics to choose 
the lower extreme on the EVO game coincides with the 
Inventory results. The difference between the:EV+ and EVO 
games in producing significant results may stem in part from 
the fact that the EV+ game contains twice as many items as 
the EVO game, which may give it greater stability. 
Question 2. Are there kinds of risk-taking situa-
tions in which schizophrenic behavior is more sharply dif-
ferentiated from the normal than in others-- b) between dice 
games and inventory measures? 
Both kinds of measures have been shown capable of 
differentiating between schizophrenics and normals. Both 
made significant differentiation at their middle levels of 
risk, but only the Inventory demonstrated a significant dif-
ferentiation at the low extreme (although the results of 
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the EVO game are in this direction but are not statistically 
significant.) It might be that with increased length, 
refinement, or a method of presentation other than the 
paired comparisons, the dice games would differentiate 
more sharply than they have. 
By examining the weighted score (Hi vs. Lo) medians 
and ranges in comparison with the possible ranges and mid 
points of the possible ranges for various measures, the 
extent to which the measure covers the range of risk-taking 
and the general attitude of subjects toward the kind of 
risk presented may be assessed. From Table 5.1 it may be 
observed that the actual ranges and the possible ranges of 
the dice games coincide. This indicates that none of the 
dice games have been able to cover the spread of subjects 
preferences for risk-taking. On the Inventory measures 
listed none of the actual ranges extend to the limits of 
the possible range and all of the medians fall below the 
mid points of the possible ranges. This appears to indi-
cate that subjects, including patients, take hypothetical 
risks of the Inventory as seriously as the "real" risks 
of the dice games. 
TABLE 5.1 
NUMBER OF ITEMS, ACTUAL RANGES, MEDIANS, POSSIBLE RANGES, AND MID-POINTS OF 
POSSIBLE RANGES OF RISK-TAKING MEASURES 
Number of Actual Median Possible 
Mid-point of 
Possible 
Items Range Range Range 
Inventory 
Work 19 6 - 68 32 0 - 76 38 
Gambling 12 2 - 37 15 0 - 48 24 
Total 40 12 -131 61 0 -160 80 
Dice Games 
EV 42 0 -112 72 0 -112 56 
EVO 21 0 - 56 35 0 - 56 28 
EV- 21 0 - 56 35 0 - 56 28 
00 
\0 
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Question 2. Are there kinds of risk-taking situa-
tions in which schizophrenic behavior is more sharply 
differentiated from the normal-- c) on the Inventory? 
The results of the Inventory sub-scales have 
indicated that there is sharper differentiation between 
schizophrenics and controls on items related to work and 
achievement, where one's own skill may effect the out-
come, than on items describing games of chance, in which 
the outcome is up to chance or external forces. This 
finding is to be expected on two counts. First, theo-
retically, the lowered se~steem of the schizophrenics 
would be expected to have relatively more influence on 
responses to situations involving achievement, which in-
volves an evaluation of one's own prowess. Secondly, the 
schizophrenics, as a group, have not been able to work and 
achieve, while the controls, as a group, are working. 
The absence of differentiation between interpersonal and 
non-interpersonal situations, which might have been ex-
pected theoretically, calls for an explanation. Two are 
suggested. First, by the nature of the selection, the 
schizophrenics, and controls, who were used in the study 
had sufficient tolerance for the threats of interpersonal 
relations to be able to participate in the study. Thus, 
there may have been less difference between the groups in 
this regard than in the area of work and achievement. 
Secondly, the items were not conceived of originally and 
constructed on an interpersonal vs. non-interpersonal 
dimension, as they were in the case of work vs. gambling 
(and .the allied achievement vs. chance). Thus the vari-
able of interpersonal vs. non-interpersonal may be dis-
tinguished less sharply. 
Question 3. Does an item analysis of the 
Inventory indicate any other specific kinds of risk on 
which normals and schizophrenics differ? 
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The individual items are not sufficiently powerful 
to differentiate significantly between schizophrenics 
and controls. The experimenter noted with interest that 
of twelve items showing a tendency (d ~ 9) in which 
controls took more risk than the schizophrenics, eight 
were of the work and achievement variety. Of three items 
tending in the reverse direction, two were the two items 
(4, 28) related to buying insurance. However, these re-
sults are too weak to bear the weight of interpretation. 
As described in Chapter IV the item analysis of 
the Inventory suggested the development of a Conformity 
Scale, which proved to be a powerful differentiator 
between schizophrenics and controls. This finding 
concurs with the common observation that schizophren-
ics often behave in a bizarre manner, failing to 
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conform to social norms. It also may be considered congruent 
with the hypothesis that schizophrenics show a deficit in 
mental functioning, for frequent deviant choices may be 
viewed as resulting from a failure in judgment or compre-
hension of an implicit social or rational standard of be-
havior. 
It may be recalled that the rejection (i.e., least 
prefer) of the Mid level of risk on the Inventory comprises 
a considerable portion of the "Rare (negatively weighted) 
responses on the Conformity Scale. This appears reasonable 
when it is observed that if the Mid level is preferred it 
cannot also be rejected and when one extreme is preferred 
one would logically reject the opposite extreme rather than 
the Mid level. Therefore, one would not normally reject 
the Mid level. This suggests that the schizophrenics in 
rejecting the Mid level more frequently than the controls 
are acting less logically, which would be indicative of a 
"deficit in mental functioning." Deficit in mental function-
ing" may also be responsible, in part, for the significant 
differences found on the "net" preference (most - least) for 
the Mid level since this is partially a function of the 
rejection of the Mid level. 
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B. Questions Related to the Auxiliary Tests 
Question 1. Will paper and pencil tests of "manifest 
anxiety" and "denial" differentiate between a) high and low 
risk-takers; b) patients diagnosed paranoid and non-paranoid? 
The Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and the K Scale 
of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory showed no 
relationship to either risk-taking behavior or paranoid 
diagnosis. Thus, the expectation that, as measures of 
"anxiety'' and "denial," they should differentiate those who 
prefer high from those who prefer low levels of risk proved 
unfounded. In addition, the expectation that if the paranoid 
schizophrenic is assumed to make a greater use of "denial" 
(of which projection is a form) than the non-paranoid 
schizophrenic, this difference might be reflected on the 
K Scale, as a measure of "denial," was not supported. 
question 2. Is a self-rating questionnaire of Luck 
related to risk-taking behavior? 
How "lucky'' people rate themselves was not found to 
be significantly related to how much risk they would take. 
It was found to be related to the TMA and K scales. The 
common element between the Self Rating Questionnaire of 
Luck and these appears to be the readiness with which a 
person either affirms or denies negative attributes. 
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Conclusions 
From the formulation that the schizophrenic reaction 
represents a withdrawal from the threat of failure which 
results in varying degrees of deficit in mental functioning 
the prediction was derived that schizophrenics have less 
preference than normals for situations representing the 
middle of the range of the continuum of risk. 1 The results 
supported this prediction. In so doing they not only helped 
to confirm the original formulation but also added weight 
to the assertion that level of aspiration and risk-taking 
behavior have many features in common, since level of 
aspiration studies had already obtained similar results. 
The "withdrawal" aspect of the formulation in the form of 
a relatively direct avoidance reaction receives additional 
confirmation from the results which showed that schizo-
phrenics tended to prefer the lower levels of risk in situ-
ations which threaten a definite loss, either real (i.e., 
the EVO game) or hypothetical (i.e., the Inventory). In 
situations in which the only loss was the absence of reward 
(i.e., the EV+ game), however, this did not occur. The 
"deficit in mental functioning" aspect of the formulation 
received additional confirmation from the results which 
1see Chapter II, part 1 for the derivation. 
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showed that schizophrenics obtained lower "Conformity'' 
scores and more frequently rejected the Mid level of risk 
on the Inventory. Both of these results, it may be re-
called, were interpreted to indicate a deficit in judge-
ment, rationality, or comprehension. If the failure of 
the Total Inventory Weighted Score to reproduce the re-
sults found on the independent analyses of the levels of 
risk is accepted as an indication of inconsistent respond-
ing on the part of the schizophrenics, then this incon-
sistency may be viewed as another indication of "deficit 
in mental functioning." Thus, hypothesis 1, that schizo-
phrenics respond to situations involving risk by some form 
of withdrawal from the threat of failure, (which embodies 
the general formulation of the schizophrenic reaction), 
is confirmed. 
This study sought also to investigate the kinds of 
risk-taking situations which would differentiate most 
sharply between schizophrenics and controls, and thus 
determine the nature of the threat of failure to which the 
schizophrenic was most sensitive. The results showed that 
the schizophrenics were more sharply differentiated from 
the controls in situations involving achievement and work 
than in chance or gambling situations. Since achievement, 
particularly in our culture, is an important determinent of 
one's self-esteem; these reuults suggest that situations 
involving a risk to the self-esteem may produce the 
greatest subjective threat, and thus the greatest degree 
of withdrawal by schizophrenics. 
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"Risk," which was treated as the objective equivalent 
of "threat" of failure," was defined in terms of the 
Expected Value model as the "product of the probability of 
loss or failure times the amount or value of the possible 
loss or failure." This definition proved of value in defin-
ing the relative levels of risk of the alternatives in the 
measures of risk-taking used in the study and in explaining 
the failure of the EV- game to yield any significant re-
sults. 
This study was least successful in the attempt to 
predict high from low risk-takers. The prediction that 
paranoid schizophrenics would be more likely to deny the 
threat of failure and thus would choose higher levels of 
risk than non-paranoid schizophrenics was not supported. 
As it was previously suggested the failure of this predic-
tion may result from the small sample size, a decreasing 
differentiation of symptom patterns in chronic patients, or 
the basic unsoundness of the hypothesis on which the pre-
diction was based. Also, auxiliary tests which were sur-
mised to be related to risk-taking behavior proved other-
wise. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Summary 
In reviewing the literature the formulation was made 
that the schizophrenic reaction represents a withdrawal from 
Threats of failure which results in varying degrees of 
deficit in mental functioning, Withdrawal, which was inter-
preted to include denial of the existence of threat, to-
gether with partial deficit in mental functioning were pre-
dicted to produce more frequent selection of the extremes 
of threat by schizophrenics than by normal individuals. 
Additionally, from an hypothesis about the characteristic 
mode of defense of the paranoid, (i.e., denial), it was 
predicted that among schizophrenics the paranoids would 
more frequently choose the greater risks. 
Two theoretical models, decision theory and level 
of aspiration theory, dealing with decision making in situ-
ations involving the threat of failure, were shown to be 
basically similar in their formulation, although differing 
in regard to the independence of probability and reward, 
and the importance of the individual's control over the 
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outcome and the motive of achievement. Risk was defined 
operationally as the negative term of the expected value 
model (probability of loss times amount of loss) and 
considered equivalent to the concept "threat of failure. 11 
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The aims of the study were to test whether predic-
tions which had received support in level of aspiration 
studies would also be supported by decision theory type 
chance taking measures and to examine the kinds of risks 
toward which schizophrenics were most sensitive. Two 
predictions were made: 1) On measure of risk-taking 
schizophrenic subjects would less frequently choose 
alternatives representing a middle level of risk (i.e., 
choose extremes more frequently) than control subjects; 
and 2) On measures of risk-taking paranoid schizophrenic 
subjects would more frequently than non-paranoid schizo-
phrenic subjects express preference for alternatives rep-
resenting a high level of risk. In addition a number of 
questions were asked regarding the kinds of risks, both 
in quality and degree, on which schizophrenic subjects 
would differ from control subjects and whether risk-taking 
were related to several other trait measures. 
From the male patient population of the Bedford 
Veteran's Administration Hospital 35 chronic schizophrenics 
who obtained on the Vocabulary test of the Wechsler Adult 
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Intelligence Scale a Standard Scores of 10 or over and were 
co-operative, were used in the experimental group. Sub-
groups of 12 paranoid and 13 clearly non-paranoid patients 
were used for testing prediction 2. The control group was 
equivalent to the experimental group in gender, age, amount 
of education, and mean Vocabulary score. As measures of 
risk-taking a Risk Preference Inventory and three Edwards 
type probability preference dice games were utilized. It 
was later demonstrated that one of the dice games (the Ev-
game) did not measure levels of risk taking. The Taylor 
Manifest Anxiety Scale, K Scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory, A Self Rating Questionnaire of Luck, 
and Arithmetic Test of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale were used as auxiliary measures. 
The data was analyzed in terms of responses to each 
level of risk treated independently and in terms of prefer-
ence among levels measured by a systematic, a-priori 
weighting of levels a) of a trend to prefer the high vs. 
low extremes; b) of a trend to prefer the middle vs. extreme 
levels. A scale of conformity, which was determined by the 
common responses of the majority of the group (based on all 
70 subjects), was also derived for the Inventory. Statistical 
measures used in the analysis of the results were the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test to test for differences between 
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groups, and Chi Square with its associated Contingency co-
efficient to test association between measures. 
The results supported the first prediction that 
schizophrenic subjects would less frequently choose items 
representing middle levels of risk, but not the second 
prediction that paranoids would more frequently choose 
high levels of risk than non-paranoids. The results which 
support the first prediction are congruent with findings 
from level of aspiration studies. The results also indicate 
that schizophrenics more frequently choose the lower levels 
of risk when there is a possibility of a definite loss (which 
represents a direct avoidance of risk), are more sharply 
distinguished from controls in this respect where the situ-
ations involve work and achievement than in gambling or 
chance situations (which indicates self-esteem is an 
important variable in determining the subjective threat 
felt in a risk-taking situation), and deviate more from 
the common responses of the majority of subjects (which 
suggests a deficit in judgment or comprehension. 
Implications for Future Research 
A. Research Related to Schizophrenia 
The finding of this study and others that schizo-
phrenics make more extreme choices (or show greater variance) 
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than normal subjects has been explained in a variety of 
I 
ways. In this study it has been explained in terms of both 
defensive withdrawal and deficit in mental functioning. 
This close interaction between these two variables in mental 
illness is most apparent in the psychoanalytic concept of 
"regression" which is perceived to cover both variables. 
If further investigation, however, could in some way 
separate out the effects of the defense and the deficit 
sufficiently, one might arrive at a more parsimonious ex-
planation of the phenomenon of extreme scoring by schizo-
phrenics. This problem might be handled in a number of 
ways. One approach would be to include in the experimental 
instrument a measure of irrational behavior which would be 
independent of risk preference scores. Then using this 
measure to factor out variance due to "deficit in mental 
functioning," it could be determined whether "withdrawal" 
alone is sufficient to explain the extreme scores of the 
schizophrenic. 
A second approach would be to construct some in-
strument similar in structure to the measure of risk but 
not involving risk, which might be used to study the char-
acteristics of deficit functioning somewhat more inde-
pendently. 
Furtherresearch is also needed to find what traits 
in patients may distinguish high from low risk-takers. 
W2 
Possibly a careful clinical appraisal of the defense 
structure of each patient at the time of testing would prove 
more efficient in predicting which patients would be high 
and low risk-takers than diagnoses or some of the paper and 
pencil tests which we have used. 
A study of risk-taking behavior comparing acute and 
chronic schizophrenics might provide some valuable clues 
on the difference between these two classes of schizophrenics. 
One might surmise that chronic schizophrenics would be less 
willing than acute schizophrenics to take risk, particularly 
in the area of work, since it may be that the unwillingness 
to face the risks involved in leaving the hospital and work-
ing is what keeps the chronic patients in the hospital, or 
since institutionalization may reduce the motivation of the 
chronic patients to face these risks. On the other hand it 
might be that the acute patients, having more recently suf-
fered failure in society, would be the ones more threatened 
by situations of risk. Also studies of risk-taking behavior 
comparing schizophrenics with other pathological groups might 
prove of considerable interest. Possibly psychopaths would 
prove more able to deny risks than our paranoids have done. 
B. Research Related to Games of Chance as Experimental 
Instruments 
The results of this study, as well as those of Lieberman 
and Ashman, have demonstrated that a variety of hypotheses 
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regarding schizophrenic behavior may be tested by means of 
experimental games of chance. It would appear, then, that 
as instruments for investigation of pathology, games of 
chance have considerable potential that would bear further 
exploration. In addition to this, or in conjunction with 
this, the relationship between behavior on these games and 
level of aspiration measures could bear further study. An 
aspect of analysis not attempted in this study is sequence 
analysis--the study of changes in betting behavior as a 
reaction to recent success or failure by normal and 
pathological groups might prove as revealing as the investi-
gation of their reaction to a present risk. One would not 
necessarily expect the same sequence of reactions in a 
betting situation as in a level of aspiration situation, 
for to lower one's goal after failure to a more reasonable 
level may be expected in a level of aspiration situation. 
It was observed, however, that many of the control subjects 
often took greater risks after losing in an effort to 
recover their losses. 
The definition of "risk" as the negative term in 
the Expected Value model (i.e., product of the probability 
of loss and the amount of loss) has proved of value in 
defining the relative levels of risk of the alternatives in 
the measures of risk-taking used in this study. By 
demonstrating that the bets of one of the dice games (EV-) 
are all equal in "risk," this definition served also to 
explain the failure of this game to yield any significant 
results. Therefore, this definition might bear further 
theoretical and experimental examination and might prove 
useful in other decision theory studies. 
C. Research and Development of the Risk Preference 
Iv:ventory. 
The Risk Preference Inventory has been developed 
largely on an a-priori basis and has proved to have some 
validity since it differentiates between schizophrenic 
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and normal groups and correlates with behavior on the dice 
games. It needs further empirical development and refine-
ment to improve its accuracy as a measuring instrument. 
Evidence has already been presented on the differ-
ential effect of achievement and chance situations on risk-
taking behavior. More discriminating sub-scales of inter-
personal vs. non-interpersonal risk might be developed 
and other sub-scales developed for other classes of risk 
(i.e., monetary or property, physical or bodily, censure, 
etc.). The degree of interrelationship among these classes 
should be studied. The relationship of the Inventory to 
other measures of interest and personality traits would 
also be useful to study to add to its empirical meaning. 
It might be conjectured, for instance, that risk preference 
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would be correlated with the Persuasive Scale on the Kuder 
Interest Inventory since jobs which involve trying to 
persuade or sell to others are commonly viewed as rather 
uncertain of outcome--and income. The Risk Preference 
Inventory might also be found to be related to the Occupa-
tional Levels score of the California Interest Inventory 
since generally the higher the occupational level one at-
tempts the less certain one may be of success. 
Since we have stereotypes about the amount of secur-
ity or risk involved in various occupations, the Risk 
Preference Inventory, as well as the stereotypes, might 
be validated by comparing groups from varying occupations 
on the Inventory. Finally, the potential usefulness of the 
Inventory as an indicator of the readiness of a patient to 
face realistically the risks of life and work outside the 
hospital should be studied. 
With even a portion of the studies suggested above, 
the Risk Preference Inventory might prove to be a fairly 
valid instrument and a tool which the counseling psychologist 
would find useful in his work of evaluation and guidance. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
On the following page is a reproduction, slightly 
reduced in size of a reference card kept before the sub-
jects throughout the experimental dice games. The circle 
graphs represent the levels of probability utilized in the 
study. The upper sectors of the circle graphs, which were 
colored red on the original reference card, represent the 
probabilities of winning. The shaded lower sectors, which 
were colored blue on the original reference card, represent 
the probabilities of losing. The numbers above each circle 
represent the numbers on which one would win at that level 
of probability and the numbers beneath represent the numbers 
on which one would lose. At the bottom of the reference 
card is a series of bar graphs representing the monetary 
levels utilized in the study. Each "coin" represents $10 
in play money. 
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APPENDIX B 
The "Data Record" sheet on the following page was 
used by the experimenter to record subjects' responses to 
the experimental dice games. 
The first four section~ containing trial or item 
numbers 1-63, were used in recording the responses to the 
first two games; the last section serves the third game. 
The blank spaces in the first four sections are where on an 
earlier form the items of a zero expected value game were 
located. This game was dropped from the experiment but the 
form containing the items was used and this form was made 
to match the older form for convenience in analyzing data. 
The second column in each section marked "V" indicates 
whether the expected value of the item is positive, negative 
or zero. The third column marked "A B" and containing 
pairs of numbers from 1 to 7 represents the pairs of bets 
presented the subject coded in terms of probability level 
(1: 3% win; 7 : 97% win). In the last section the letters 
"a" through "g" represent the monetary values of the bets 
in the 50-50 game (a • $10; g • $360). By circling the 
number (or letter) under A or B the experimenter could 
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record the kind of choice made by the subject. In the last 
column marked Rs the experimenter could record with+ or-
whether the subject won or lost the bet. The double line 
before some items indicates that those items are used in the 
practice game. 
APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLES OF PAIRS OF BETS FROM THE TiiREE EXPERIMENTAL DICE 
GAMES AS PRESENTED ON 3 x 5 CARDS 
First Game Second Game 
(expected value • +$10) (expected value • -$10) 
A A 
Win Lose Win Lose 
Chances 50% 50% Chances 97% 3% 
Payoff $20 0 Payoff 0 $360 
B B 
Win Lose Win Lose 
Chances 78% 22% Chances 22% 78'7. 
Payoff $13 0 Payoff 0 $13 
Third Game 
(expected value = 0) 
A 
Win Lose 
Chances 50% 50% 
Payoff $10 $10 
B 
Win Lose 
Chances 50% 50% 
Payoff $90 $90 
(It may be noted that all of the four elements of the expected 
value formula are available to the subject.) 
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APPENDIX D 
THE RISK PREFERENCE INVENTORY 
(This was known to the subjects only as "Part B") 
On the cards to follow you will be presented situa-
tions in Which you will have a choice between three alterna-
tives A, B, C. State which alternative you would most 
prefer or be most likely to choose and which you lease pre-
fer or would be least likely to choose. There are no right 
or wrong answers. An answer is right if it is the way you 
really think you would choose if you were in that situation. 
Mark X to indicate the alternative you prefer ~ and 0 
to indicate the alternative you prefer Least. 
1. If you were a truck driver and were offered a choice 
among three loads to haml from Boston to New York, 
which would you choose? 
A. To haul a load of wood for $50 for the trip. 
B. To haul a load of gasoline for $75 for the trip. 
c. To haul a load of high explosives for $100 for 
the trip. 
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2. Each week about half the men (about 20) of a group of 
men that work together play "poker" with the serial 
numbers on their pay checks. Before getting their 
checks, they vote on how much everyone who plays will 
put into the pool which the winner will get. Would you--
A. Vote for all those who play to pay 25¢ into the 
pool. 
B. Be among those who prefer not to take part in the 
game. 
C. Vote for all those who play to pay $1.00 into the 
pool. 
3. If you had a choice between these three jobs, which 
would you choose? 
A. An average paying job working with a group you 
have heard are friendly but don't know personally. 
B. A fairly low paying job working with a group of 
people you know and like. 
c. A well paying job with a group you know nothing 
about. 
4. You have just bought a car and you are considering how 
much insurance to take out. Would you--
A. Buy only the compulsory insurance, figuring you 
probably won't be in any major accidents. 
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B. Buy enough additional insurance to cover most of 
any serious financial loss which might result from 
an accident. 
C. Buy as much insurance as you can possibly afford 
to be as well insured as possible in case of an 
accident. 
5. A friend who owes you $10.00 suggests three ways of 
repaying. Which would you prefer? 
A. You flip a coin for it--double or nothing. 
(That is, if he wins he owes you nothing and if 
he loses he pays you $20.00.) 
B. You flip for half of what he owes you. (If he 
wins he pays you $5.00 and if he loses he pays 
you $15.00.) 
C. He just pays you the $10.00 he owes you. 
6. While working at a job you enjoy, you learn that there 
is an opening for a more advanced position which you 
might like but which would require your taking on new 
responsibilities you're not sure you can handle. Would 
you--
A. Accept the new position if it is offered to you, 
figuring that if it is offered to you your super-
visor is probably sure you can handle it. 
B. Do as much as you can to get the new position. 
C. Try to avoid taking the new position since you 
know you like and can do your present job. 
7. If you were a writer, would you prefer to earn your 
living--
A. Writing a book which could bring you fame and 
fortune if it became a best-seller. 
B. Writing newspaper reports on a steady salary. 
C. Writing magazine articles which you'd have a 
better chance of selling than the book, gaining 
some recognition and a substantial payment 
whenever one was sold. 
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8. A store which wants to attract more customers is ask-
ing its present customers which method they should 
use to attract them. As a customer, which would you 
prefer? 
A. For the store to have a "lucky number" contest 
with one or two very valuable prizes given away 
to a few winners. 
B. For the store to give trading stamps which could 
be saved for premium items. 
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c. For the store to have a "lucky number" contest 
giving away a fairly large number of small prizes 
to many winners. 
9. On a job you have a choice of working under one of 
three supervisors. Which would you choose? 
A. One who tells his workers exactly what has to be 
done and how it should be done. 
B. One who tells his workers what has to be done 
but leaves it up to them to figure out how to 
do it. 
C. One who only checks that the work is being done, 
but leaves it up to his workers to decide what 
has to be done and how to do it. 
10. A friend of yours would like to start a new business, 
but he has only half the amount of money he needs to 
do so. He comes to you to borrow the other half. 
You have the money and are willing to lend it to him. 
How would you like him to repay you? (He is willing 
to agree to any way.) 
A. Have him repay the money as a straight loan. 
B. Have him consider all the money as an investment 
in his business for which you will receive half 
the profits, if any. 
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c. Have him consider half of the money as a straight 
loan to be repaid and consider the other half to 
be an investment in his business for which you 
will get one fourth of the profits, if any. 
11. If you were a printer and had a customer who wanted 
something printed by a certain deadline which you 
figure you have a 50-50 chance of meeting, which way 
would you prefer to be paid~ 
A. A flat payment of $75 whether you meet the deadline 
or not. 
B. A flat payment of $50, plus a bonus of $50 if you 
meet the deadline. 
c. A flat payment of $25 (barely enough to cover 
expenses), and a bonus of $100 if you meet the 
deadline. 
12. If you were playing in a poker game and found that 
you were losing, would you--
A. Set yourself a definite limit (less than the 
amount you have with you) which you could easily 
afford to lose, and stop when you reach that 
limit. 
B. Play as long as you have money to play with. 
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C. Borrow money with which to try to win back money 
you've lost, if you lose more than you have with 
you. 
13. Which of these jobs would you choose? 
A. One with a rather low salary, but which includes 
a pension plan, accident and hospital insurance, 
and liberal sick leave benefits. 
B. One with a moderate salary, which has accident 
and hospital insurance and sick leave benefits, 
but no pension plan. 
C. One with a fairly high salary, but no extra 
"fringe" benefits. 
14. If you are looking for a job and have only time to 
visit one firm, would you choose to visit the one 
at which--
A. You have a 50-50 chance of being hired and would 
be paid an average wage. 
B. You are likely to be hired, but only paid a 
minimum wage. 
c. You have only a slight chance of being hired, 
but if hired, you would be paid an excellent 
wage. 
15. If you were a T. V. repairman and have been asked 
to fix an old set which you estimate you have a 
50-50 chance of repairing; how would you prefer to 
be paid--
A. A flat payment of $5.00 for your work. 
120 
B. $10.00 if you are successful in fixing the T. V. 
and nothing if you are unsuccessful. 
C. $3.00 for your work plus a bonus of $4.00 if you 
are successful in repairing the set. 
16. If you were driving along a back street at 3 A. M. 
and came to a stop sign, would you--
A. Come to a full stop just in case there might be 
a policeman nearby. 
B. Go right through, feeling sure no one would be 
around at that time of night. 
c. Slow down considerably but not come to a full 
stop. 
17. You have been lost in a forest for some time and you 
have become very hungry. The only thing you have 
been able to find that you could possibly eat is 
some berries, but you think they might possibly be 
poisonous. Would you--
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A. Try a few, taking a chance that a few might make 
you sick. 
B. Figure that if they taste alright they are probably 
good, so eat as many as you want. 
C. Not touch them. 
18. Which of these jobs would you choose? 
A. A rather low paying job doing things you've done 
before and are sure you can handle without dif-
ficulty. 
B. An average paying job which would be partly doing 
things you've done before and partly doing things 
you've never tried before. 
c. A well paying job doing mostly new things you've 
never tried to do before. 
19. If you had a choice between these three jobs, which 
would you choose? 
A. A very well paying job with a firm whose production 
is seasonal so that when there is a lay-off most 
of the men have to look for another job. 
B. A rather low paying job with a firm whose produc-
tion is very steady and never has lay-offs. 
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C. An average paying job with a firm which occasion-
ally has slow downs and brief lay-offs, but 
usually hires most of its workers back. 
20. Would you prefer a job with a company which offers--
A. Secure, steady work but little or no opportunity 
for advancement. 
B. Rapid advancement for the best men, but fires 
most of the rest after a trial period. 
C. A fairly good opportunity for advancement and 
fires employees who don't keep their production 
up. 
21. If you were taking a job as a salesman and were of-
fered these ways of being paid, which would you 
choose? 
A. A small base wage plus a small commission accord-
ing to how much you sell. 
B. A commission based entirely on how much you sell. 
c. A flat wage regardless of how much or little you 
sell. 
22. If you were the owner of a small store which has been 
losing money, would you--
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A. Keep going, making a few inexpensive improvements, 
hoping that business will improve. 
B. Sell the store as soon as you can before you lost 
any more money. 
C. Spend all you can on improving the store and trying 
to increase your sales. 
23. If you were to take a job as a salesman selling on 
commission, would you prefer to sell--
A. Medium-priced items which about half your customers 
will buy and which provides a medium commission 
for each sale. 
B. Expensive items which only a few customers will 
buy which provides a large commission when a sale 
is made. 
C. Inexpensive items which most of your customers will 
buy but which provide a small commission per sale. 
24. While on a trip through Reno, Nevada you stop at a 
diner which has three slot machines. Each machine has 
a jack-pot of 100 coins which it pays off after about 
the same number of plays. You decide to gamble $2.00 
on one of the machines. Would you--
A. Gamble your $2.00 (20 dimes) on the dime machine 
which has a jack-pot worth $10.00. 
B. Gamble your $2.00 (8 quarters) on the quarter 
machine which has a jack-pot worth $25.00 
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C. Gamble your $2.00 (2 silver dollars) on the silver 
dollar machine which has a jack-pot worth $100.00 
25. In a dice game you are faced with a choice between 
three bets. On each bet you lose $2.00, if you lose; 
but the amount you win and your chances of winning 
depends on which bet you choose, Would you choose 
the bet on which--
A. Your chances are 1 out of 10 of winning $16, and 
9 out of 10 of losing $2.00. 
B. Your chances are 9 out of 10 of winning $•22, and 
1 out of 10 of losing $2.00. 
C. Your chances are 5 out of 10 of winning $2.0~ and 
5 out of 10 of losing $2.00. 
26. You are a member of a union which is voting on whether 
to strike for higher wages against a company which at 
present pays rather low wages and is offering only an 
insignificant wage increase. Would you vote--
A. To strike, insisting on a considerable increase 
in wages, which might mean being out on strike 
a long time with a considerable loss of income in 
the immediate future. 
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B. To strike, but agree to compromise on wage demands, 
which would probably mean a much shorter time out 
on strike and less loss of immediate income. 
C. Vote not to strike at all, rather than lose any 
wages. 
27. If you were the owner of a small grocery store and 
you learned that a large super-market was being built 
nearby which may offer stiff competition, would you--
A. Hold onto the store, taking the chance that if 
you can't keep up with the competition, you may 
have to sell at a loss. 
B. Hold onto the store and invest all you can in 
improving it to meet the competition, taking the 
chance that you may lose a great deal if you have 
to eventually sell out. 
c. Sell your store as soon as you could and take a job 
in the super-market. 
28. You have recently bought a small business and you are 
considering whether to buy fire insurance. Would you 
probably decide--
A. That the chances of a fire are pretty small, so 
you can get along without insurance. 
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B. To buy, at moderate cost, an insurance policy which 
will cover property losses due to fire. 
C. To buy an expensive insurance policy which covers 
loss of income occurring while your property is 
being repaired, as well as property losses due to 
fire. 
29. While driving with a friend who likes to bet on almost 
anything, he suggests betting on whether the license 
plate of the next out-of-state car to pass ends with 
an odd or an even number. He leaves it to you to de-
cide what the loser should pay the winner. Knowing 
that your chances of winning or losing are equal, 
whiah of the following would you suggest? 
A. The loser buy the winner a cup of coffee or 
a coke. 
B. The loser buy the winner a snack at the next snack 
bar (for not over 75¢). 
c. The loser buy the winner a full course dinner. 
30. With $2.00 to bet at a horse race would you pick--
A. The horse thought to be most likely to win which 
pays off $3.00 on a $2.00 bet. 
B. The horse which is not the favorite but which has 
a fair chance of winning and pays off $8.00 on a 
$2.00 bet. 
C. The horse which is believed to be very unlikely 
to win and pays off $100 on a $2.00 bet. 
31. If you had a choice between three poker games, which 
would you choose? 
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A. To play in the game in which there are chances of 
winning or losing considerable amounts of money. 
B. To play in the game in which one can only win or 
lost a small amount of money. 
C. To play in the game in which no money is involved. 
32. You have inherited $500 and wish to invest it. 
Would you--
A. Buy government bonds which are very secure but 
pay a low rate of interest. 
B. Buy stock in a large well-established company 
where the investment will be moderately safe 
and the interest rate is higher. 
C. Buy stock in a new company you have heard of 
where the chances are 50-50 of doubling the in-
vestment in a year if the company succeeds or of 
losing most of it if the company fails. 
33. If you were offered a choice of these repair jobs 
with an electric company and had the skill to 
qualify for any of them, which would you prefer? 
A. One paying $1.25 per hour repairing equipment 
which is always disconnected from any electric 
current. 
B. One paying $2.50 per hour repairing lines or 
equipment carrying ordinary house current 
(120 volts). 
C. One paying $5.00 per hour repairing main lines 
often carrying very high voltages. 
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34. On a new job you have just been asked to do something 
you've never done before. Would you prefer to--
A. Ask enough questions to be sure you know exactly 
what to do and how to go about it. 
B. Try to complete the whole task, taking a chance 
on making some mistakes, to show you can think 
for yourself and do things on your own. 
C. Go ahead with the task until you come to some 
part you're not sure of and then ask. 
35. Going to the races you have, in addition to your ad-
mission ticket, $10.00 to spend as you like. Would you--
A. Use $5.00 to bet on the races and keep $5.00 to 
spend in some other way. 
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B. watch the races, spending nothing on betting, and 
keep the entire $10.00 to spend in other ways. 
c. Use the entire $10.00 to bet on the races. 
36. You are on a T. V. quiz program and have just won 
$100 for answering the questions asked. You are 
shown a box which you are told contains ten balls: 
half of them black and half of them white, and one of 
them has a gold star on it. You are given three 
choices. Which would you take? 
A. To reach in the box blindfolded, winning $50 if 
you draw out a white ball and losing $50 if you 
draw out a black one. 
B. To reach in the box blindfolded, winning the 
grand prize of $900 if you draw out the ball 
with the gold star and losing $100 if you draw 
out any of the other balls. 
c. Take the $100 you've won already and leave. 
37. You have just taken out of the refrigerator a steak 
which you plan to cook for dinner. In examining it 
you suspect that it may have started to go bad. 
Would you--
38. 
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A. Cook it and eat it only if it seems alright 
after cooking. 
B. Take no chances with it and throw it out imme-
diately. 
c. Cook it and eat it even if it still seems a 
little off after cooking. 
If you were planning a sUlliDer party for a group that 
liked outdoor picnics most, but you had no knowledge 
of what the weather was going to be on the date you 
set for the party, would you--
A. Plan to hold the party at ''Mountain Lake," a 
beautiful place, but where you would have to 
cancel it if it rained. 
B. Plan to hold it at a local park which has a 
shelter you can stand under if it rains. 
c. Plan to hold the party indoors. 
39. of these work situations which would you prefer? 
A. A job with a well-established firm which offers 
steady employment at a good wage, but not much 
chance for advancement. 
B. Start a new business, using your money, in which 
your income will be determined by the success of 
the business. 
c. A job with a new comp~y which offers a low 
starting wage, but plenty of opportunity for ad-
vancement. 
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40. At a fair you have 25¢ and want to spend it in one of 
these three ways. Which would you choose? 
A. Buy a chance on a T. v. set or some other expensive 
prize. 
B. Buy a grab bag which contains some item you would 
like to have worth between 10¢ and $1.00. 
c. Buy some 25¢ item. 
41. A friend of yours. needs $20 to get into a poker game 
and has only $10. You have the $10 and are willing 
to let him have it. How would you prefer to be re-
paid? 
A. By his giving you half his winnings but nothing 
if he loses. 
B. By his giving you a quarter (\) of his winnings, 
but at least $5.00 if he loses. 
c. By his repaying the $10.00 as a straight loan 
whether he wins or loses. 
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APPENDIX E 
ITEM CHARACTERISTICS OF THE "RISK PREFERENCE INVENTORY'' 
(Order of the alternatives within each item, subscales in which each item 
is used, and the popular and rare responses used to form the 
'.'Conformity" score.) 
Positions 
Lo Mid Hi 
A B c 
B A c 
B A c 
c B A 
c B A 
c A B 
B c A 
B c A 
A B c 
A c B 
A B c 
Work 
lrame 
w 
G 
(W) 
G 
w 
w 
w 
w 
Inter-
Personal 
Not-Inter-
l>ersonal 
N 
I 
I 
I 
I 
N 
I 
I 
I 
Chance-
-. -·-----
Achieve- Mo 
ment Lo 
A 
-
c + 
A 
-
A 
c 
A 
A 
Conformity Score 
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-
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+ 
+ 
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Item Lo Mid Hi Game 
12 A B c G 
13 A B c w 
14 B A c w 
15 A c B w 
16 A c B 
17 c A B 
18 A B c w 
19 B c A w 
20 A c B w 
21 c A B w 
22 B A c w 
23 c A B w 
24 A B c G 
25 B c A G 
26 c B A w 
27 c A B w 
Inter-
Personal 
NOt-Inter-
"""personal 
I 
N 
I 
N 
N 
N 
I 
N 
I 
N 
N 
I 
Chance-
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-
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A -
A 
A 
A 
A 
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c 
A 
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-
-
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-
-
-
- + 
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..... 
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w 
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Item Lo Mid Hi G'ame l>ersonal 
28 c B A N 
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31 c B A G 
32 A B c N 
33 A B c w N 
34 A c B w I 
35 B A c G N 
36 c A B G N 
37 B A c N 
38 c B A I 
39 A c B w 
40 c B A G N 
41 c B A G I 
19 w 16 I 
12 G 17 N 
Conformitv S 
Chance-
Achieve- Mosc x 
ment Lo Mid- Hi Lo 
+ 
-
c 
c 
-
-
-
A 
A + 
- -
c 
c 
-
- -
-
A 
c 
c + - - -
16 A ~4 'tl -tO ~2 
10 c -5 -2 -15 -6 
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-
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-
-
+ 
-
- + 
-
+ 
-
-
+ 
- + 
-
-
+ 
+0 +13 
-28 - 0 
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APPENDIX F 
The "Data Record 211 sheet which follows was used 
by subjects to record their answers to paper and pencil 
tests. 
"Part A" serves as the record form for the com-
bined Abbreviated Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory K Scale, on 
which the items were checked either under T for true or F 
for false. "A" written in on the "Data Record 2" sheet 
indicates an item and the response scored on the anxiety 
scale and "K" indicates the item and response scored on 
the K-scale. 
"Part B" serves as a record form for the Risk 
Preference Inventory with the columns A, B, C for the 
alternatives of each item. 
"Part C" serves as a record form for the Self 
Rating Questionnaire of Luck. The rows 1 through 7 rep-
resent the seven sentences and the columns represent the 
subjects characterization of a sentence: A, applies best; 
B, applies next best; C, applies next least; D, applies 
least. Weights for each of the 28 possible responses 
were derived in the following manner. A, B, C, D were 
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weighted a-priori +2,+1,-1, -2 respectively. The seven 
sentences were also weighted a-priori from +2 for no.2, 
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"I always seem to have only good luck," through 0 for an 
equal mixture of good and bad luck (no.3), to -2 for no.4, 
"I never have any good luck; it's always bad." The product 
of row and column weighting provides a matrix of the 
original cell weightings. By adding the constant, 4, to 
each cell, the cells were given final weightings from 0 to 8 
which were all positive. By summing the final weightings 
of the four responses required of each subject and subtract-
ing 6 a score was obtained on a scale having a possible 
range from 0 to 20 with 0 indicating a very low self estimate 
of luck and 20 indicating a very high self estimate. 
0 i i 1 w i hti rLg:na eLgJ ngs Fi 1 W i h . na e Lgl t~ngs 
A B c D A B c D 
no. wt. ; +l +.L -.L -l 
--- -----~----------------
1 -1 -2 -1 1 2 1 2 3 5 6 
; 
2 +2 4 2 -2 -4 2 8 6 2 0 
i 
3 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 4 4 4 
: 
4 -2 I -4 -2 2 4 4 0 2 6 8 
I 
5 +1 I 2 1 -1 -2 I 5 6 5 3 2 
I 
6 +1 I 2 1 -1 -2 : 6 6 5 3 2 
I 
7 -1 : i -2 -1 1 2 7 2 3 5 6 
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Subj. 
DATA RECORD 2 -------
Date 
Part A Part B 
-- --
No T F No TfF No A B c No A!B c No I A I B c 
1 K 26 K 
I ! 1 26 I I 
2 K 27 K 2 27 
---
3 K 28 A ~ 28 
~ --·--· 
4 K 29 K 4 29 
5 A 30 K 5 30 
6 A 31 K 6 31 
' 
7 K 32 A 7 32 
8 K 33 K 8 33 
9 A 34 A 9 34 
10 K 35 A 10 35 
11 K 36 K 11 36 
12 K 37 A 12. I 37 
13 A 38 A 13 38 
14 A K 39 A 14 39 
15 A 40 K 15 40 
-
16 A K 41 K 16 41 
17 . K 42 K 17 ~· Part C I No --18 K 43 A 18 
"' 
A B c D 
19 A 44 K 19 1 
20 A 45 A 20 2 
21 K 46 K 21 3! 
22 A 47 K 22 4 
23 A 23 5 
2.4 A K 24 9 6 
25 K 25 I 7 i 
1. 
2. 
3. 
APPENDIX G 
THE COMBINED ABBREVIATED TAYLOR MANIFEST ANXIETY SCALE 
AND MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY K.SCALE 
(This was known to subjects only as "Part A") 
Part A 
At times I feel like swearing. 
At times I feel like. smashing things. 
I think a great many people exaggerate their mis-
fortunes in order to gain the sympathy and help of 
others. 
4. It takes a lot of argument to convince most people 
of the truth. 
5. I believe I am no more nervous than most others. 
6. I work under a great deal of tension. 
7. I have very few quarrels with members of my family. 
8. Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain 
profit or an advantage rather than to lose it. 
9. I cannot keep my mind on one thing. 
10. Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and 
grouchy. 
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11. At times my thoughts have raced ahead faster that I 
could speak them. 
12. Criticism or scolding hurts me terribly. 
13. I am more sensitive than most other people. 
14. I frequently find myself worrying about something. 
15. I am usually calm and not easily upset. 
16. I certainly feel useless at times. 
17. It makes me impatient to have people ask my advice 
or otherwise interrupt me when I am working on some-
thing important. 
18. I have never felt better in my life than I do now. 
19. I feel anxiety about something or someone almost all 
the time. 
20. What others think of me does not bother me. 
21. It makes me feel uncomfortable to put on a stunt at 
a party even when others are doing the same sort of 
thing. 
22. I am happy most of the time. 
23. I have periods of such great restlessness that I 
cannot sit long in a chair. 
24. I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling 
up so high that I could not overcome them. 
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25. I find it hard to make talk when I meet new people. 
26. I am against giving money to beggars. 
27. I get mad easily and get over it soon. 
28. I find it hard to keep my mind on a task or job. 
29. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking 
of the right things to talk about. 
30. At times I am full of energy. 
31. I have periods in which I feel unusually cheerful 
without any special reason. 
32. I am not unusually self conscious. 
33. I think nearly anyone would tell a lie to keep out 
of trouble. 
34. I am inclined to take things hard. 
35. Life is a strain for me much of the time. 
36. At times I think I am no good at all. 
38. I am certainly lacking in self confidence. 
39. I am a high strung person. 
40. At periods my mind seems to work more slowly than 
usual. 
41. People often disappoint me. 
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42. I often think, "I wish I were a child again." 
43. I sometimes feel that I am about to go to pieces. 
44. I have often met people who were supposed to be 
experts who were no better than I. 
45. I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty. 
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46. I find it hard to set aside a task that I have under-
taken, even for a short time. 
47. I like to let people know where I stand on things. 
APPENDIX H 
SELF RATING QUESTIONNAIRE OF LUCK 
(This was known to subjects only as "Part C") 
Part C 
Read over first all of the sentences below carefully. 
Then check ~ opposite the number of the sentence you feel 
applies to you best; and check B opposite the number of the 
sentence you feel applies to you ~ best. Then check 
D opposite the number of the sentence that you feel least 
applies. 
~: 
(-1) 1. Although I've occasionally had some good luck, 
(+2) 
(0) 
(-2) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
I feel that on the whole I have more bad luck 
than good. 
I always seem to have only good luck. 
On the whole I feel that I have a mixture of 
good and bad luck, about equal amounts of each. 
I never have any good luck; its always bad. 
( tl) 5. The "breaks" usually seem to come my way, and 
I feel that on the whole I am a lot luckier 
than the average person. 
142 
(~1) 6. Although I occasionally had some bad luck, I 
feel that in general I have more good luck 
than bad. 
(-1) 7. Things often seem just to go against me, and 
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I feel that on the whole I am much less lucky 
than the average person. 
(The sentence weightings, not known to the sub-jects, have been added here in parentheses be-
fore the sentences.) 
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ABSTRACT 
The aims of this study were: (1) to test whether 
hypotheses regarding the behavior of schizophrenics which 
had received support in level of aspiration studies would 
also be supported by decision theory type chance taking 
measures; and (2) to examine the kinds of risks toward 
which schizophrenics were most sensitive. 
Two theoretical models, decision theory and level 
of aspiration theory, dealing with decision making in 
situations involving the threat of failure, were shown to 
be basically similar in their formulation; they differed, 
however, in regard to the independence of probability and 
reward, and the degree of the individual's control over 
the outcome and the motive of achievement. "Risk," which 
was considered to be the objective equivalent of the 
clinical concept "threat of failure," was defined opera-
tionally as the negative term of the expected value model 
(i.e., as the product of the probability of loss and the 
amount of possible loss). 
The schizophrenic reaction was formulated as a 
withdrawal from the threat of failure which results in a 
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deficit in mental functioning. Withdrawal was interpreted 
to include denial of the existence of threat. From this 
formulation it was predicted that schizophrenics would more 
frequently select the extremes of risk and thus less fre-
quently select the middle level of risk than would normal 
individuals. In addition, hypothesizing that the paranoid 
schizophrenics were more likely to deny the existence of 
threat, it was predicted that of the schizophrenics the 
paranoids would more frequently select the greater risks. 
In addition a number of exploratory questions were asked 
regarding the kinds of risk, both in quality and degree, 
on which schizophrenics would differ from normal individuals. 
The experimental group was composed of 35 chronic 
male schizophrenics with WAIS Vocabulary standard scores of 
10 or over. Subgroups of 12 paranoid and 13 clearly non-
paranoid schizophrenics were used for testing the second 
prediction. The control group of 35 subjects was equiva-
lent to the experimental group in gender, age, amount of 
education, and mean Vocabulary score. Three dice games, 
modeled after Ward Edwards' measures of probability-
preferences in gambling, and a Risk Preference Inventory 
were utilized as measures of risk-taking behavior. The data 
from these measures were analyzed in several ways: 1) The 
levels or degrees of risk within each measure were examined 
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independently. 2) Overall trends across levels within each 
measure were examined by the systematic a-priori weighting 
of the levels. These trends were: a) the tendency to 
prefer the middle as opposed to the extreme levels of risk 
and b) the tendency to prefer the low as opposed to the 
high ex~remes of risk. Subscales measuring different kinds 
of risk-taking situations and a scale of conformity to the 
common responses made by the majority of subjects were also 
developed from the Inventory. 
The results supported the first prediction, that 
schizophrenic subjects would less frequently choose 
alternatives representing middle levels of risk, but not 
the second prediction, that paranoid schizophrenics would 
more frequently choose high levels of risk than non-paranoids. 
The results which support the first prediction are congruent 
with the findings from level of aspiration studies. It was 
also found (1) that schizophrenics more frequently choose 
the lower levels of risk when there is a possibility of a 
definite loss (which represents a direct avoidance of risk), 
(2) are more sharply distinguished from control subjects in 
this respect where the situations involve achievement and 
work rather than purely chance and gambling situations (which 
suggests that self-esteem is an important variable in de-
termining the subjective threat felt in a risk-taking 
situation, and (3) deviate more from the common responses 
of the majority of subjects (which implies a deficit in 
judgment or comprehension). 
151 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
I was born in Newton, Massachusetts on September 22, 
1929 0f Robert Everson and Belle Hicks Briggs. I married 
Gertraude Heineken of Bremen, Germany on May 25, 1956. Our 
daughter, Barbara, was born March 25, 1959. 
, I received my Bachelor of Arts Degree in June, 1951 
from Swarthmore College and my Master of Arts Degree in 
June 1955 from Boston University. 
I have worked two years in Europe as a volunteer 
with the Brethren Service Commission as an alternative to 
military service. While attending graduate school I have 
held positions as psychiatric aide at McLean Hospital, re-
search technician at Massachusetts General Hospital, counsel-
ing psychologist trainee with the Veteran's Administration 
at Brockton, Boston and Bedford Veteran's Administration 
Hospitals, and as research assistant at the Human Relations 
Center of Boston University. 
152 
